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I. INTRODUCTION
A presumption in favor of freedom of assembly is firmly rooted in
western liberal democratic theory: The freedom to join with others to
voice political grievances and messages. However, the need for
government restraints aimed not specifically at assemblies, but generally
at keeping the peace, adversely affects the peoples' freedom to
assemble.' Unfortunately, the number of restraints available should not
be surprising. The range of important state interests affected by free
assembly is wider than those affected by other acts of expression.
Assembly involves the potential for violence against individual citizens
and for broad civil disorder caused by mob activities. In addition, while
violent protest may bring about change, civil governments cannot
survive if they allow the use of such methods. These concerns explain
the general acceptance of freedom of assembly as a non-absolute right.
Thus, the state's legitimate interest in maintaining order in a free
society creates a fundamental tension with the freedom of citizens to
assemble. As one commentator suggests, both politicians and their
constituencies treat freedom of assembly and public order in a
schizophrenic manner.2 The line between protection of the peoples'
1. The effect of public safety considerations on the freedom to assemble has been
well recognized by courts. See Hague v. Committee for Indust. Org., 307 U.S. 496
(1938). For example:
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest
of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to
the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good
order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
Id. at 515-16.
2. See Conor Gearty, Freedom of Assembly and Public Order, in INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN BRITAIN 39 (Christopher McCrudden and Gerald Chambers
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right to assemble, and the State's duty to maintain the public order, is
often arbitrarily drawn and influenced by unprincipled political and
social considerations.
The evolution of the law defining freedom of assembly in England
attests to the difficulty of maintaining a stable balance between public
order and the freedom to assemble. English common law has
experienced periods where the right to freely assemble in the form of
parades and marches was nearly absolute. However, in the recent past,
Westminster has certified an approach favoring public order that leaves
free assembly susceptible to politically and socially motivated
repression. While reprehensible to the civil libertarian, statutes such as
the Public Order Act 1986' have arguably succeeded in maintaining
peace and social harmony in Britain, albeit at the expense of unpopular
speech. The same cannot be said for Northern Ireland, which operates
under a nearly identical statutory instrument
The history of Northern Ireland is marred by sectarian conflict
between the Catholic and Protestant communities. Seventy-five years of
exclusion from participation in government has left Catholics with, "a
burning sense of grievance.reinforced by both institutional and informal
discrimination. 6 Similarly, Protestants "see themselves confronted by a
sullen minority which they believe wants to destroy their Constitution
and put them in the hands of a state they fear to be both economically
underdeveloped and one of Europe's most reactionary theocratic states."7
Essentially,. Protestants see themselves as the last vestige of all the
Protestant ideals that they have historically associated with
"Britishness." This bi-cultural dynamic creates civil instability. Since
Northern Ireland's political birth in 1921,, the Province has experienced
all manners of civil unrest-from local vigilantism, to massive scale
rioting and guerrilla warfare.8 In many cases, one community's exercise
eds., 1994).
3. "Westminster" refers to the English Parliament housed at Westminster. See
infra text, Part III.
4. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64 (Eng.).
5. See Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 S.I. 1987, No. 463.
6. HAROLD JACKSON, REPORT: THE-Two IRELANDS: THE PROBLEM OF THE DOUBLE
MINORITY-A DUAL STUDY OF INTER-GROuP TENSIONS 3 (1979).
7. Id.
8. From 1969-93, an estimated 3,466 deaths have been attributed to sectarian
violence. See MALCOLM SUTTON, AN INDEX OF DEATHS FROM THE CONFLICT IN IRELAND
(1994) (excerpt available on the internet at the Conflict Archive on the Internet Web
Service (CAIN), located at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/>). CAIN is an ongoing conflict
of the right to parade on the public highway, much to the discomfort of
the other community, has touched off these sectarian "fires." 9
Though the ferocity of "the Troubles"'" has subsided over the past few
years, arguably, the conflict has not altogether disappeared, but instead
smolders beneath the surface. Paramilitary cease-fires and broad-based
support of the most recent peace initiatives have created a new
atmosphere of tenuous understanding between the polarized Catholic
and Protestant communities. With the advent of the Good Friday Peace
Accord," and the long-delayed convening of Northern Ireland's new
assembly,'2 the future political stability of Northern Ireland looks more
promising than ever. However, the social stability of the province at the
street level is questionable. Although the leaders of Northern Ireland's
major political parties have reached an agreement for a peaceful way
forward, that agreement was reached with much apprehension and
intense political pressure from the international community.'3
In truth, the real test of Northern Ireland's new broad-based
government will come from the population of Northern Ireland at
"ground zero" of the troubles, which has personally sacrificed for, and
suffered at the hands of sectarian strife. Annual conflict between
institutions such as the Orange Order, and the organizations that oppose
expressions of Ulster Protestantism, pose a real threat to the reluctant
peace reached by leaders of Northern Ireland. Moreover, these populist
study project developed by a partnership of the University of Ulster, Queen's University
Belfast, and Linen Hall Library, Belfast.
9. See infra Part VII.
10. The "Troubles" are generally understood to refer to the sectarian strife that has
existed for the last thirty years in Northern Ireland between Protestants loyal to the
British Crown and Catholics who support Irish Republicanism or nationalism. See TIM
PAT COOGAN, THE TROUBLES: IRELAND'S ORDEAL 1966-1996 AND THE SEARCH FOR
PEACE 1 (1996).
I1. See infra Part IX.
12. See Direct Rule in North Due to End At Midnight, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999.
However, just before this Article went into print, the British Government suspended the
Northern Ireland Assembly and re-imposed direct rule over the province. See Political
Uncertainty Returns to North as Direct Rule Is Reimposed, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 12, 2000.
13. The Good Friday Peace Accord was reached between Northern Ireland's
political parties only after long, intense negotiations chaired by U.S. Senator George
Mitchell, and after President Bill Clinton's personal intervention in the process. See
How Can We Best Repay Our Debt to Mitchell, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 24, 1998. See also,
Clinton Saw Need to Play Down Vital Role in Northern Ireland, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 11,
1998. Moreover, the New Northern Ireland assembly was not convened until after Sinn
F6in reluctantly agreed to Ulster Unionists' insistence that it could back out of the
Northern Ireland Assembly if the IRA did not decommission its weapons by February
2000. See Agreement Allows Trust to Grow and Escape Hatch, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 27,
1999. Apprehension was also the primary factor in the British government's suspension
of the new Assembly on February 15, 2000 over the issue of paramilitary arms
decommissioning. See Political Uncertainty Returns to North as Direct Rule Is
Reimposed, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 12, 2000.
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organizations on both sides of the sectarian divide are not as susceptible
to international pressure as their leaders may be. This is clearly
demonstrated by the history of Northern Ireland, which includes a
tradition of fierce independence at the popular grass roots level.'
4
Despite social and political progress, the two communities in Northern
Ireland remain culturally, politically, socially, and geographically
distinct. 5 While some of the rural areas are to a certain degree "mixed,"
"many individual streets or estates in working-class areas are designated
or acknowledged as identified with one faith or the other.'
6
This history of segregation and intolerance is resurrected and re-
examined annually during the traditional Orange Order marching season,
when ancient social animosities are revived. Given the "enclave" make-
up of Northern Ireland's larger cities, often an Orange parade will pass
through a Catholic Nationalist neighborhood, to the great dismay of its
residents. These Orange parades either intentionally or inadvertently
serve two purposes. First, they symbolize and strengthen cultural
identity in the Protestant Community and have become a linchpin to a
culture under attack. Second, they serve to remind Catholics of
centuries of discrimination including their relegation to second class
citizenship at the hands of their parading neighbors, and indirectly
reaffirm traditional support for militant Irish Nationalism.
Thus, the tentative atmosphere of understanding is, and will continue
to be, severely tested each summer as Protestant Orangemen and
Catholic neighborhood groups take to the streets. However, under the
current legal machinery, civil authorities, in attempting to maintain
public order, only placate one community at the expense of the other. If
the state allows a contentious Protestant Loyalist parade to march
unrestricted through a Catholic Nationalist neighborhood, invariably, the
march requires the protection of a full-scale police action, which often
includes hundreds of heavily-armed police officers in armored Saracen
cars and riot gear. 7 In many instances, Catholic residents are forcibly
cordoned off in their homes until the parade passes.'8 Most Catholics
perceive the excesses of official protection of free assembly as just
another indignity in a long history of Protestant abuse and discrimination
14. See infra Part VII.
15. See NEIL JARMEN, MATERIAL CONFLICTS 87 (1997).
16. Id.
17. See Catholics Riot After Orange Marchers Win, TIMES (London), July 12,
1996 (available at <http://www.sunday-times.co.uk/>).
18. See id.
against the Catholic minority. Yet, if the same parade is restricted from
the Catholic neighborhood, Protestant Loyalists believe the state is
pandering to Nationalist terrorists and insurgents. Protestants also
perceive overtures to the Catholic community to be at the expense of
their right to walk on the street and to foreshadow the re-integration of
Protestant Northern Ireland into the predominately Catholic Republic of
Ireland, with the consequential severance of economic and cultural ties
with Great Britain.'9 Thus, the balance between free assembly and
public order needs to be re-examined in a broader social and historical
context. Not only is the comfort of the community disrupted by the
exercise of the right of free speech and assembly, but arguably, the
fragile peace in Northern Ireland is threatened as well.
The authorities in Northern Ireland continue to operate under a
statutory regime similar to, if not more authoritarian than, the system
employed in England.0 Though armed with impressive legal weaponry,
as discussed herein at Part VII, this power was frequently used at the
expense of individual civil liberties for discriminatory and political
purposes. Where authorities have tried to act impartially, the use of
police powers has done little to preserve public order, and in many
situations, has had the opposite effect.2' Conversely, attempts to reform
Northern Ireland's police powers seem to elicit a similar level of anger.
The recent report of the Patten Commission on Police Reform has, in
reality, proposed only symbolic change. Yet public reaction to it has
been doubtful at best and simply abusive at worst. The latest enactment,
the Public Processions Act 1998,22 may have removed some of the bugs
in the legal machinery, but many see this as too little, too late.23 As will
be demonstrated, the history of parade regulation in Northern Ireland
resembles a knot. The State's use of police powers in either direction, to
protect the rights of marchers, or alternatively to prevent disorder by
banning such marches, increases the tension between antagonistic
19. See NORMAN PORTER, RETHINKING UNIONISM: AN ALTERNATIVE VISION FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND (1996) (excerpt available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/
docs/porter.htm>). Porter points out that since the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 and
the Downing Street Declaration of 1993, Britain has been perfectly content in a sort of
neutrality with respect to Northern Ireland, and has given the Republic of Ireland a larger
role in the government of the province, thus making good on promises Lloyd George,
then Prime Minister of Great Britain, made when trying to reassure Michael Collins and
Arthur Griffith of the temporary character of the division of Ireland, "in order to
persuade Ulster to come in there is an advantage in her having a Catholic population. I
think you will get Ulster into an Irish unit on agreed terms. We promise to stand aside
and you will not only have our neutrality but our benevolent neutrality." Id.
20. See infra Parts IV, VII.B.
21. See infra Part VII.
22. Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act, -1998, ch. 2 (Eng.).
23. See infra Part VIII.
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groups and complicates efforts to relax hostilities.
This Comment will discuss Northern Ireland's contentious Orange
marching season and will review the history of Northern Ireland and its
significance to the present day antagonists. It will further explore the
law of Northern Ireland that is designed to protect the right to parade
while preserving the public order, and consequently the related British
legal machinery and its common law development. This Comment will
also discuss the failure of Police Powers with respect to contentious
parades in Northern Ireland, and will analyze the Parades Commission's
prospects for success in diffusing sectarian animosity and violence
associated with parading in Northern Ireland as its new government
embarks on a long and rocky road to a permanent peace.
II. THE ORANGE ORDER AND ORANGE PARADES
Named in commemoration of William of Orange, who in 1690
secured Protestant rule in Ireland with his victory over the Catholic King
James II, the Orange Order celebrates William's victory at the Battle of
the Boyne each year on the Twelfth of July.24 Formed in 1795, the
Orange Order is a fraternal society dedicated to preserving the Protestant
identity in Northern Ireland, and consequently, is opposed to the
Catholic Church.25 Wearing orange sashes and bowler hats, the uniform
of their forefathers, Orangemen march in honor of their heritage, part of
which includes the oppression of Catholics. 6
24. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 94.
25. One of the most zealous religious leaders within Northern Ireland and a
frequent supporter of the Orange Order and the Loyalist movement is the Reverend Ian
Paisley. Paisley's zealotry is perhaps best exemplified by his behavior at a meeting of
the European Parliament in 1988 addressed by the Pope. He was removed from the
chamber after holding up a sign that read: "John Paul II Antichrist,' and shouting "I
renounce you as Antichrist." COOGAN, supra note 10, at 397.
26. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 101. But see The Grand Orange Lodge of
Ireland (available at <http://www.grandorange.org.uk/>) (for a discussion the Orange
Order's sentiment towards its Catholic neighbors). For instance, according to the
Derrykeevan Temperance Loyal Orange Lodge 352, an Orangman
should love, uphold, and defend the Protestant religion, and sincerely desire
and endeavour to propagate its doctrines and precepts; he should strenuously
oppose the fatal errors and doctrines of the Church of Rome, and scrupulously
avoid countenancing (by his presence or otherwise) any act or ceremony of
Popish worship; he should, by all lawful means, resist the ascendancy of that
Church, its encroachments, and the extension of its power, ever abstaining
from all uncharitable words, actions or sentiments towards Roman Catholics.
Id.
The Order confirms to the faithful that Ulster remains a Protestant
state for a Protestant people. In addition, Orange parades have several
deeper layers of importance. As one commentator points out, "[a]
parade is more than just a marking of territory, it is a central cultural
icon. It is not taking place simply to give an aggressive message to the
Nationalist community, but is, for many, symbolic of the identity of the
Protestant community. 27  It plays a specific political role within that
community and is therefore a political resource within the politics of
unionism. As MacDonald notes, the Order's "sectarianism has at times
been so intense that its members were occasionally expelled for
attending funerals in Catholic churches. 28 Although the Orange Order
is only one of several Protestant orders which conducts parades, Orange
parades have become the most significant.29 The phrase "Orange
parades" is generically used to refer to all Protestant Loyalist parades. °
During the earlier stages of Northern Ireland's devolved government,
known as Stormont,3 Orangemen routed their annual parade through
Catholic enclaves as a test of the status quo, namely, the continued
Catholic acquiescence to Protestant hegemony.32 As MacDonald notes,
"[i]f the provocation of the Orange parades met with Catholic rock-
throwing, stern oppressive measures were called for; if the parade met
27. DOMINIC BRYAN, ET AL., POLITICAL RITUALS: LOYALIST PARADES IN
PORTADOWN (1995) (available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/rituals.htm>).
28. MACDONALD, CHILDREN OF THE WRATH: POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND 64 (1986).
29. See infra Part II.
30. NEILL JARMAN, MATERIAL CONFLICTS: PARADES AND VISUAL DISPLAYS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND (1997) (excerpt available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/parade/
jarman.htm>). There are several other Loyalist organizations that parade. The
Blackmen, from Counties Armagh and Down, host a large parade and gathering on July
13 at Scarva, Co. Down, reputedly on the route that William of Orange's army took on
its way south. The Black parades continue through August, until their main
demonstration on the last Saturday of that month, which marks the traditional end to the
parading calendar. Where the Orange Order represents working class secularism and
Protestant paramilitary emblems, the Black parades give less emphasis to the military
history of Protestantism, and are heavily dominated by religious themes. Alongside
membership of the Orange and Black some men also belong to the Apprentice Boys of
Derry, which, with a membership of around 12,000 men, is the smallest of the three main
orders. The Apprentice Boys are based in the city of Londonderry; their main purpose is
to commemorate the events of the siege of the city in 1688-89. The three senior loyal
orders are responsible for organizing the major annual parades that commemorate the
Williamite and Somme anniversaries. They also organize a wide range of smaller
parades, which have increased in number to such an extent that the period from Easter to
the end of August is now known as the marching season. See id.
31. The Partition of Ireland established two governments for the island. In 1932,
Stormont became the seat of Northern Ireland's devolved Parliament. The Stormont
parliament maintained control over the six counties of the Province until its suspension
in 1972, when the British government announced direct rule over Northern Ireland. See
JONATHAN BARDON, A HISTORY OF ULSTER, 467, 513, 689-90 (1992).
32. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 64-65.
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with nothing more than grudging resentment, the status quo was
considered secure for another year."33  In this respect, arguably the
annual Orange parades reinforced Protestant social and political unity by
insuring the existence of Catholic resentment to the Protestant State.
The Orange Order was, and to a large extent still is today,34 intimately
connected to the Unionist Party,35 traditionally appointing a quarter of
the members of the Ulster Unionist Council, the Unionist Party's
caucusing body.36 In Northern Ireland's early years, the informal power
of the Order within the party was even greater, as membership at the
upper levels of the two organizations was relatively indistinguishable.
All but a few leading Unionist members of government were
Orangemen.37 Also, Orange Halls were generally the meeting places for
local Unionist constituency associations, forming both the structure and
substance of the Unionist Machine.38 Arguably, the upper class of
Unionism exercised control over the Orange Order in the early years.
This, however, has been changing because the majority of the Orange
Order's members, the Protestant laboring classes, have recently become
more politically aware and have substantially influenced Unionism's
policies.39
33. Id.
34. The political rise of a disenchanted Loyalist working class has recently
strained Unionist solidarity, so that some movements within the Orange Order have
drifted away from the traditional allegiance to mainstream Unionist politics. See BRYAN,
supra note 27.
Significantly higher rates of unemployment and the reduced ability of the local
private sector to provide employment, and the disempowerment of the political
elite after 1972-caused by the collapse of Stormont-seems to have created
greater alienation within the Protestant working class such that the parades,
particularly in the industrialized towns, could became an expression of
opposition to the state.
Id.
35. The Unionist Party is used herein to mean the loose alliance between the
several different parties that share Unionism as a political ideology, including the Ulster
Unionist Party (UUP), Northern Ireland's largest political party. Other member groups
are lined up at various points on the right side of the political spectrum. The UUP
provided each government at Stormont from Partition until suspension. See id. See also
COOGAN, supra note 10, at 546; MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 58.
36. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 64-65.
37. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 72.
38. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 65.
39. See supra note 34. An excellent example of Protestant working class influence
is found in the Ulster Workers' Council Strike of 1974. After the Province's political
leaders reached an agreement to create a new power-sharing government for Northern
Ireland, working class Loyalists staged strikes throughout Northern Ireland that
paralyzed the province and brought down the Sunningdale power sharing executive as it
In exchange for its influence, the Orange Order helped integrate
Protestant workers into the traditionally conservative Unionist Party.
The Orange Order militated against class conflicts within the Protestant
community by attracting the working class to a "populist" organization
that was nonetheless controlled by the conservative business and
professional classes. Arguably, the Order coaxed Protestant workers
into a political system controlled by their traditional social "superiors"
by bringing the working classes together with the industrialists in a
fraternal setting. Thus the Orange Order helped to blur otherwise
politically divisive social issues, and provided cohesiveness to the
40Protestant community. Cohesiveness, though, was not cheap;
Conservatives had to pay a price for Orange support. That support came
in the form of traditional colonial privileges provided to Protestants over
Catholics.4'
The Orange Order has traditionally showcased its political and social
significance with public parades. Today, the Twelfth of July remains the
centerpiece of the marching season, and the climax of most Orange
parades.42 The Twelfth of July generates the biggest parades and crowds
and the most color and noise, as well as the most disruption and
protests.43 One of the most surprising features of the Orange tradition is
that it still manages to retain a diversity of features within a single
organization. Virtually all denominations within the Protestant faith
come together within the framework of Loyalist parades. This is possible
because that framework, while nominally religious, is principally about a
collective national identity."
was known. See also BARDON, supra note 31, at 707-12.
40. See infra Part V.B.
41. This system of patronage arguably led to the social inequities of the mid-
twentieth century as evidenced by discrimination against Catholics in employment,
housing and public office. See John Whyte, How Much Discrimination Was There
Under the Unions Regime, 1921-1968?, in CONTEMPORARY IRISH STUDIES (Tom
Gallagher, James 0' Conner, eds. 1983) (excerpt available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/
issues/discrimination/whyte.htm#chapl>). As MacDonald argues:
This could have cost Protestant workers dearly, however, for it divided the
working class and prevented it from claiming the benefits brought by class
solidarity. But as citizens of the United Kingdom, Protestant workers received
the full entitlements of the British welfare state. Thus they were cushioned
from the consequences of their sectarianism; although divided from Catholic
workers, Protestant workers still enjoyed the benefits won by the unity of the
British working class-The post Second World War Welfare state.
MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 65.
42. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 114.
43. Seeid. at 101-06.
44. See id. at 108. Jarmen also notes that this Protestant unity is also, "created in
opposition to those who are excluded from he day's events, the Roman Catholic
population, who are allowed no part in the proceedings, and are in some cases virtually
imprisoned for the day, as the daily routine is put on hold." Id.
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The Orange parades are no small affairs. During the annual Twelfth
of July parades, Northern Ireland comes to a virtual standstill as
hundreds of small parades feed into larger ones throughout the day.
Although there are eighteen main parades on the Twelfth of July, the
total number of notifications, and therefore legally recorded parades, on
the Twelfth in 1995 was 547. Over 20 percent of all Loyalist parades
are held on a single day.45 In more recent years the number of Loyalist
parades have grown,46 and although the body charged with regulating
these parades has imposed a larger number of restriction on a larger
number of parades, the numbers of illegal parades and disorderly
parades have skyrocketed.47
In the past, the elaboration of Loyalist parades and displays occurred
largely in response to perceived political threats; parading was a way of
displaying and affirming communal strength and local dominance.48
More recently, with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985,49
which gave the predominantly-Catholic Republic of Ireland a say in
45. See ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY, CHIEF CONSTABLES' ANNUAL REPORT
1996 (available at <http://www.ruc.police.uk>).
46. In 1986 there were 1731 Loyalist parades, and in 1996 there were over 3000.
For official statistics, see Royal Ulster Constabulary (visited Mar. 17, 2000)
<http://www.ruc.police.uk>.
47. According to the statistics published by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, in 1996
there were 2405 Loyalist parades, 28 were either conditioned or re-routed, 8 were
deemed illegal, and disorder was observed at 15. In 1997, Loyalist parades grew to
2586, 30 were conditioned or re-routed, only 1 was deemed illegal and disorder occurred
at 6. By contrast, in 1998, there were 2659 Loyalist parades, 59 of which were re-routed
and a further 9 were conditioned. More notably, the number of illegal parades soared to
75, and the number that became disorderly grew to 18. See id.
48. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 56-57. Jarmen argues that Ireland saw an
increase in Protestant parading during the early 1800's in response to O'Connell's
growing campaign for political emancipation. He states that the "parades were local
expressions of power and dominance," and the "growing culture of parading also served
both to build more connections between people and places of similar faith, and at the
same time to intensify the social distance from those of the other faith." Id.
49. See GARY MCMICHAEL, ULSTER VOICE 16-17 (1999). The Anglo-Irish
Agreement, otherwise known as the Hillsborough Treaty, gave the Irish Republic a
"structural role in the affairs of Northern Ireland," but as McMichael points out, "it was
negotiated over the heads of the people of Northern Ireland." Id. See also BRYAN, supra
note 27.
During 1985 and 1986, the town of Portadown, in County Armagh was shaken
by a series of violent civil disturbances which were significant even in terms of
the recent troubled history of Northern Ireland, and perhaps unique given the
town's relatively small population of 30,000. In the period from the spring of
1985 to the autumn of 1986 there were six major riots.
Id.
Northern Ireland's internal affairs, Protestants have come to regard
Northern Ireland's constitutional link with England at its weakest since
the political turmoil surrounding the Partition of Ireland.50 The response
is more parades.5'
Parading is historically linked to the Protestant community and is
sometimes referred to as the finest expression of Orange culture.52
Protestant Loyalists perceive parading as a cultural "rallying point" and
an expression of their civil rights. Yet, Nationalists have often used
parading to express their culture and heritage as well,53 though to a lesser
degree. From the Easter rising of 1916, various Republican
organizations expanded the use of parading as a form of expression. In
spite of the insistence on the importance of parading as a tradition, with
all the implications of continuity and lack of change that that word
suggests, police records55 show that there has been a steady increase in
Loyalist parades over the past ten years. The figures also show a vast
imbalance between the number of parades that are held by the two
dominant communities: Loyalist parades outnumber Republican parades
56by a ratio of around ten to one.
The discrepancy between the number of Loyalist and Nationalist
parades is related to the broader political history of Ireland. Protestants
have historically used the imbalance of power in the north to constrain
Nationalist and Republican parades. Loyalists expect to be able to
march where and when they wish in their country, but they regard
Nationalist parades as a threat to public order. Loyalist parades are
inevitably presented as cultural and traditional rather than political,
while Nationalist, and in particular Republican, parades are seen as
50. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 120. According to McMichael, The Unionist
population perceived the Anglo-Irish agreement as a betrayal. He quotes one Unionist
M.P. as saying: "I stood outside Hillsborough, not waiving a Union flag-I doubt
whether I will ever again-not singing hymns, saying prayers or protesting, but like a
dog and asked the government to put in my hand the document that sold my birthright."
MCMICHAEL, supra note 49, at 10.
51. See MCMICHAEL, supra note 49, at 120.
52. See id. at 121.
53. The marching season is dominated by the parades of the loyal orders; but there
is also a distinct Nationalist parading tradition that is part of the wider culture of
parading. The Nationalist parading bodies, the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH) and
the Irish National Foresters (INF), as well as the Republican movement, organize many
parades throughout the marching season, and in recent years the Republican movement
has readily taken up the practice of parading as an element of its own culture of
remembrance. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 136.
54. See id. at 136-68, for an excellent discussion of the Nationalist parading
tradition.
55. See ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY CHIEF CONSTABLE, supra note 43.
56. For example, in 1998, there were a total of 2659 Loyalist parades and 229
Nationalist parades. See supra note 47.
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political and therefore provocative and confrontational. For example,
Loyalists perceive their parades as akin to Fourth of July Parades in the
U.S.; Nationalist parades are perceived as something closer to Marxist
demonstrations. Loyalists invoke "tradition" wherever possible, and the
language of politics is avoided. Traditional parades are presented as
unproblematic and non-contentious, whereas political parades need to be
carefully policed and constrained. The opportunity to demand and to
exercise the right to march is thus a symbol of the distribution of
political power in Northern Ireland, and is used as a means of
confirming that Ulster is British.
Nationalists, on the other hand, see Loyalist parades as triumphant
expressions of superiority, as coat trailing, and as an indicator of the
continuing differences in communal civil rights. Residents' groups
opposing Orange parades began to appear in 1995 in various Catholic
neighborhoods in Northern Ireland . These residents' groups generally
demand that Orange marchers seek the neighborhood's consent before
parading through these sensitive areas. Failing such efforts, they
demand that the Orange parades be re-routed. 8 The Loyalists have
generally refused to negotiate with these groups, and have shown even
less consideration to requests to voluntarily re-route these parades. The
perception is that such actions would be a capitulation to Sinn Fin and
other forms of Republicanism. 9 In the end, both perspectives are valid.
Parades are expressions of culture, displays of faith, and acts of
domination; but they are also intimately linked to the wider political
domain. This paradox renders it impossible to denounce either
community's position on the parades issue as irrational.
The insistence by the Orangemen that they have a right to walk
anywhere in Northern Ireland, and that Ulster is primarily a Protestant
province, is annually put into practice, and the entire six counties are
encapsulated within the trace of "traditional" Orange parade routes.
During the summer, centuries of resentment and antagonism boil to a
head as Loyalist Orangemen square off against Catholic Nationalists.
While a majority of Loyalist parades are more like community social
gatherings, 6° a small number of parades are contentious. 6' These
57. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 130.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 131.
60. As the Irish Catholic writer Ruth Dudley-Edwards noted, one greatly under-
appreciated aspect of many of the Orange parades is their sense of fun. Many parades
are family occasions with a strong sense of community and pageantry-men, women and
contentious parades draw the ire of Catholics that live along the path of
the parade route. Often times, Catholic Nationalists will stage counter-
demonstrations or Gaelic cultural events nearby that draw Nationalists
from all corners of Ireland.62 The high concentration of antagonists in
proximity to the parade routes escalates tensions between the two
communities, and despite the presence of the police, often lead to
violence. The decision to allow or ban a single Orange Parade has
pitched Northern Ireland into chaos, marked by Province-wide rioting,
burning, looting and murder.63
While both Loyalists and Nationalist blame each other for the
predicament, and the Police attempt to maintain a much-desired
appearance of civility and impartiality, the perception that each group
wishes the world to receive hardly represents reality. A cross section of
the parade issue is found in the factual summary in Scullion v Chief
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.64
On 12th July 1986 an Orange procession made its way from Dungannon to
a field outside the town. The only practicable route from Dungannon to the
field lay along the Ballygawley Road past the Housing Estate, which is
predominantly, if not exclusively, a Roman Catholic estate. When such
processions have passed along this route in other years, there has been trouble.
Various bands taking part in the procession take pleasure in stopping at the
entrance and taunting the residents. Some supporters are keen to make their
way into the estate in order to cause trouble or throw stones and bottles into the
estate. Some of the residents take pleasure in shouting abuse and in throwing
stones and bottles at the procession. These are a regular feature of processions
on 12th of July and other days.
Superintendent Johnston of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and a number of
other police officers went at about nine a.m. to the front of the estate in order to
keep the peace. As the day wore on a crowd of 25 to 30 youths gathered in the
estate armed with stones and bottles and intending to attack the procession. A
tricolor was produced by them and waved provocatively as the procession
passed. Supporters of the procession had stopped at the entrance to the estate
and stones and bottles were exchanged. Superintendent Johnston did everything
children take part. See Derrykeeven Temperance Loyal Orange Lodge 352
<http://www.grandorange.org.uk/>.
61. See supra notes 47, 48. In many instances, the contentiousness of the parade is
not necessarily the parade itself, but certain aspects of the parade. Commenting on a
Parades Commission decision to allow an Orange Parade through a Nationalist
neighborhood, Conor Murphy, a Sinn F6in member of the new Northern Ireland
Assembly, voiced the concern of residents: "They object to many of these bands,
especially those who carry paramilitary LVF and UVF logos, and the 'kick the Pope'
band." Commission Looks At SF Proposal For March Route, THE IRISH TIMES, Aug. 26,
1999.
62. See NEIL JARMEN & DOMINIC BRYAN, PARADE AND PROTEST: A DISCUSSION OF
PARADING DISPUTES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, pt. 4 § 13 (1996) (excerpt available at
<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/parade.htm>). See also MICHEL SAVARIC,
CONFLICTING SYMBOLS, SYMBOLS OF CONFLICT AND SYMBOLIC CONFLICT-THE
DRUMCREE CRISES (1998).
63. See infra Part VII.
64. Transcript (Q.B. June 10, 1988) (available on LEXIS).
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in his power to prevent a disturbance and acted even-handedly as between those
connected with the procession and the residents of the housing estate.
Mr. Scullion is thirty-three years of age and is a free lance press
photographer. Mr. Scullion took a number of photographs of the procession as
it left Dungannon and a number of photographs from the housing estate. He saw
missiles being thrown from the direction of the procession at the residents and
missiles being thrown at the procession by youths in the estate. He witnessed for
the first time a baton charge by police to disperse the gang of youths in the
housing estate who were throwing missiles and took a photograph of that baton
charge. He saw a person being grabbed by the police and taken into the bushes
in Braeside in the estate and apparently set upon by the police. I am satisfied
that this was a middle aged man called Eugene Faloon who subsequently
brought a claim against the police and that it was not a youth whom Sergeant
Wilson of the Royal Ulster Constabulary observed as involved in the
disturbance and arrested. This youth was subsequently convicted of disorderly
behavior and assault.
Mr. Scullion moved forward from his position behind the baton charge to
observe the incident involving Mr. Faloon, intending to take further
photographs. I am satisfied that a police officer struck him with two blows of
his fist on the right side of the face as Mr. Scullion moved forward, that at this
time Mr. Scullion had two cameras around his neck and a camera bag on his
shoulder and was known to the police as a press photographer. He had already
produced his press card on occasions to police officers at the estate.
I am satisfied that Mr. Scullion was knocked off balance by the blows; that
another police officer grabbed his coat and kneed him in the testicles or area of
the groin; that three or four police officers gathered round him, pushing and
shoving and punching and one of them said: "Get that fucker out of here"; that
he was seized and forced away from the area where Mr. Faloon was in fact
being unlawfully assaulted; that a police officer with a riot gun put the gun to
Mr. Scullion's face and said: "If you lift those cameras again, I will fucking kill
you." I am satisfied as I have said that all these assaults were made by police on
a person whom they knew to be a press photographer.
65
Theoretically, the authorities have broad police powers at their
disposal to head off collisions between the two communities. In
practice, however, either using or restraining to use these powers acts as
a catalyst for public disorder and violence. This begs the question: What
can be done in the short run to prevent these contentious parades from
degrading into or touching off sectarian violence, yet in the long run,
promote, or at least not inhibit, community reconciliation?
III. THE LEGAL MACHINERY FOR CONTROLLING PARADES IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
In Great Britain, and consequently Northern Ireland, there is no
requirement to seek permission to hold a parade-it is considered to be a
65. Id.
civil right.66 However, under the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order
1987 ("1987 Order"), several formalities were observed.67 Under article
3, parade organizers had to notify the police of their intentions to hold a
parade, and indicate the route and the probable number of participants at
least seven days in advance.68 This was, and still is, done by filling out a
detailed form known as an "11 / 1." Parade organizers are not required
to receive permission from the police, and most parades follow their
intended routes with little or no regulation.69 However, violation of the
notice requirement carries stiff consequences. If the notice did not
comply with article 3, a person who organizes or takes part in the
procession is guilty of an offense defined in article 3(5) and they may be
punished under article 3(8). 70
Under the 1987 Order, if the Senior police officer was of the opinion
that the parade could cause serious public disorder he or she could
impose constraints (on music played, on flags displayed, etc.) or order
that the parade take a different route.7' The Senior Police officer is
defined under the 1987 Order as "a member of the Royal Ulster
66. The law recognizes the right of persons to demonstrate or process along a
public highway subject to such restrictions as are imposed by statute. See WHYTE, supra
note 41. See also R v. Secretary of State ex parte Breen, Transcript (Q.B. July 7, 1992)
(available on LEXIS):
It is important to bear in mind that before a parade takes place the organisers
thereof do not require the permission as such of the police to proceed with such
a parade. They have to serve a notice of their intention to do so pursuant to
Article 3 of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987.
Id.
67. Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, S.I. 1987, No. 463. This Act
remained law until March 1998, when the Public Processions Act, 1998, went into effect.
The changes are significant. See infra Part VII.B. However, the notification formalities
for the relevant part remained unchanged.
68. See Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, art. 3.
69. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 119.
70. See In the Matter of an Application by Patricia White for Leave to Apply for
Judicial Review, Transcript (Q.B. July 11, 1996) [hereinafter Patricia White].
71. See Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order, 1987 art. 4(3)(b). Article 4(1)
reads:
If a senior police officer, having regard to the time or place at which and the
circumstances in which any public procession is being held or is intended to be
held and to its route or proposed route, reasonably believes that-
(a) it may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or
serious disruption to the life of the community; or
(b) the purpose of the persons organizing it is the intimidation of others
with a view to compelling them not to do an act they have a right to
do, or to do an act they have a right not to do.
Also, he may give directions imposing on the persons organizing or taking part
in the procession such conditions as appear to him necessary to prevent such
disorder, damage, disruption or intimidation, including conditions as to the
route of the procession or prohibiting it from entering any place specified in
the directions.
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Constabulary ("RUC") not below the rank of superintendent.,
7
1
Violating the directions of the Senior Police Officer may result in a six
month sentence and/or a statutory fine for a summary conviction, or 2
years for conviction under indictment.
73
Under article 5 of the 1987 Order, the Secretary of State had the
discretion to ban all processions in the area for up to three months, or
allow the parade in question and prohibit all other parades in the area for
one month.7' This power was exercised when the Secretary of State,
after receiving information from the RUC, believed the Section 4 powers
would be inadequate to prevent serious disorder, or would result in
undue burden on the military or police. 75 The Secretary of State was not
obliged to make an order under article 5, and power to do so only arose
if he or she forms the requisite opinion.76
There are other remedies available to residents, however these
remedies offer no long term solution to prevent the same disruption on
the next scheduled parade. Where parade participants abuse, or threaten
to abuse, the right to parade, an action for nuisance may provide the
aggrieved individuals civil law remedies. Where criminal violence
erupts, criminal sanctions may be warranted. However, "the courts
cannot under the law as it currently stands arbitrate on disputes between
those wishing to process and those opposed to such processions."77
Moreover, prosecutions pose their own problems. Often times, evidence
is hard to obtain and successful prosecutions may stir up more violence
than that created by the original offense.78  Furthermore, post-event
remedies are only temporary and by no means remedial, in that the same
parade will be scheduled again the next year, pitching the antagonists
against each other once again with an added year of resentment.
The discretion of the Police and the Secretary of State in imposing
prior restraints appears to be nearly absolute. If someone applies for
judicial review of the decision to restrict, or to allow a parade go through
unrestricted, the law is fairly clear. The standard of review is very
72. Id. art. 4 (3)(b).
73. See id. art. 4(5),(6)(a, b).
74. See id. art. 5.
75. See id. art. 5(1), (2).
76. See An Application by McManus for Judicial Review, Transcript (Q.B. May 4,
1990) [hereinafter McManus].
77. WHYTE, supra note 41.
78. When Ian Paisley was jailed for "parade excesses" his supporters rampaged
through Belfast, fighting running battles with the RUC. See infra Part V.F.
deferential, as the reviewing court is not to decide whether a particular
procession should or should not take place. The court is only entitled to
review the decision-making process material to that particular decision."
A relatively common feature of English law is that the courts must
trust the administrative decisions of the authorities. In addition, judges
also seem to recognize the dilemma the authorities face, namely,
selecting a course of action that implicitly favors one community over
another, regardless of the actual decision reached. 0 Even when judges
disapprove of the ultimate decision, they recognize that the law allows
the Chief Constable to form his own subjective opinion on the relevance
of the factors pertinent to the decision making process and,
consequently, will defer to that opinion.8'
79. See Patricia White, supra note 70. See also McManus, supra note 76: "The
purpose of judicial review is to ensure that an individual receives fair treatment by the
decision making authority-it is not to ensure that the authority, after according fair
treatment, reaches a conclusion the Court considers to be right." Id. (citing Chief
Constable v. Evans, 1 W.L.R. 1155, 3 All E.R. 141 (1982)). This type of judicial review
is commonly referred to as Wednesbury Reasonableness. It applies to a decision,
which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards
that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided
could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a
question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped
to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial
system.
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., I K.B. 223 (1948).
80. See WHYTE, supra note 41.
In exercising the powers conferred by Article 4 and Article 5 the police and the
Secretary of State respectively have very difficult decisions to make in given
cases. Any given situation requires a careful consideration and weighing-up of
many factors. The police and the Secretary of State will be privy to much
information, some of it possibly of a highly confidential nature, which will
inform their decision. In the highly charged situation currently prevailing in
Northern Ireland it is inevitable that whatever decision is reached by the police
or Secretary of State in any given case it will attract criticism from one side of
the community or the other. It is highly regrettable that this should be so. It is
even more regrettable that those opposed to the decision in any given case
consider it appropriate to take the type of violent and anarchic actions which
the community in Northern Ireland have had to suffer over the last few days.
Id.
81. See Re Armstrong, Transcript (Q.B. 1992) (available on LEXIS). The case
involved a petition by Catholic residents to compel the RUC to ban or impose conditions
upon a parade along the Catholic Lower Ormeau Road of Belfast. A similar parade that
had passed down the road a month earlier became very disruptive. The RUC forced 300
protesters off the street and cordoned them off in adjoining alleys. Many of the parade
participants paused to shout abuses in front of a bookmakers shop, where 5 months
earlier, members of the Loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force killed 5 Catholics. The abuses
shouted included the slogan "Five-Nil" referring to the sectarian murders. Justice
Nicholson, in refusing the petition, stated,
There is no doubt that there was disruption to the life of the community. That
can be seen quite clearly on the video tape. The annoyance and upset felt by
the community must be given careful consideration, not least when there had
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This statutory scheme had the practical effect of placing the final
decision to ban or alter a contentious parade on the local police. If the
police did not object to a parade, it continued as planned. Where the
police did perceive a threat to public order, the parade could be restricted
or restrained.
Britain attempted to address some of these concerns through the
recently enacted Public Processions Act.82 The act created a commission
of appointed officials charged with the task of deciding whether to
restrict parades. However, the Parades Commission has no authority to
issue an outright ban, only the British Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland has that authority. Moreover, the Parades Commission works
closely with, and is dependent upon the local police for advice in
rendering a determination. The Chief Constable may also seek an appeal
of the Commission's determination when he believes a different
outcome is warranted. Both communities have doubts about this
arrangement. Catholics resent the involvement of the RUC which they
have historically perceived 'as "militarized unionism. '83 Protestants, on
the other hand, have become increasingly skeptical over Britain's ability
and desire to protect their civil rights. As discussed further herein, the
statutory framework is still vulnerable to political and social abuse, and
been sectarian murders committed in February and persons in the procession
behaved so unforgivably at the scene -where the murders were committed.
Disruption does not have to be long-lasting in order to be serious. Serious
disruption can occur temporarily. But it seems to me that the phrase 'serious
disruption to the life of the community' or'"serious damage to property' and
that there is more likely to be a genuine difference of opinion as to whether the
life of a community is affected than there is about the other 2 phrases in the
Article. For instance, the protesters' lives were more, disrupted than was the
community. Accordingly, I consider that the Chief Superintendent is entitled
to his opinion that the life of the community was not seriously disrupted on
that date. Others are entitled to have a different opinion.
Id.
82. Public Processions (Northern Act) 1998, ch. 2 (Eng.). See infra Part VII.B for
a discussion of this Act.
83. See BRYAN, supra note 27.
Most RUC members come from the unionist tradition, and the force's main
mission, upholding the security of Northern Ireland, matches unionism's
principal political goal. As the RUC became a major victim of republican
violence in pursuit of this goal, unionist identification with the police force has
strengthened. The RUC, through its membership and through its symbolism,
also reflected core unionist values of the preservation of the existing order,
respect for monarchy and the British system of government .... In a sense, the
RUC has adopted the characteristics of a 'paramilitary' force.
Id.
fails to address the issue of parades in a manner conducive to a
continuing peace.
Civil rights in Northern Ireland are historically linked to English
common law, and the right to march in Northern Ireland has evolved
simultaneously with its English cousin. However, the purposes and
manners in which the right was exercised and the governments' reaction
thereto eventually diverged. For these reasons, it is important to
examine the evolution of the right to march in England to obtain an
understanding of the legal factors that address this important social issue
in Northern Ireland.
IV. THE RIGHT TO MARCH IN ENGLAND
The freedom to assemble is derived from the more substantive
constitutional presumption in favor of free speech. Essentially, free
assembly can be characterized as more than one person exercising his or
her right to free speech in unison. As Gearty points out: "[i]ts
importance lies in the belief that there is truth as well as safety in
numbers."' Because the methods used to effectively amplify speech are
limited (i.e., television, radio, and the press), the freedom to assemble
insures that despite limits on communication resources, everyday people
will have a forum in which their ideas may be heard, namely the
streets.85 While parading along the street may be festive and innocuous,
parading may also be intimately linked to the more significant aspects of
freedom of assembly: The right to extol one's shared beliefs in a
communal and public manner. Yet, free assembly also poses a threat to
civilized society by endangering an individual's right to security and
protection under the law. In this respect, exercising the right of free
assembly often comes at a cost to public order and an individual's right
to be free from the excesses of the masses.
Northern Ireland draws most of this legal framework from English
common law. In many respects, the treatment accorded the right to
parade in Northern Ireland is no different than in the rest of the United
Kingdom. The maintenance of public order conditions the right to
march; the police are in charge of determining when public order is
threatened; the police or civil authorities may impose conditions or
restrictions on a march; and judicial review of these decisions is limited
and deferential.
84. Gearty, supra note 2, at 39.
85. See id. at 40. Thus, Gearty argues that "freedom of public assembly represents
the ultimate safeguard for democracy." Id.
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A. Evolution of the Common Law
In Britain, the nineteenth century decision of Beatty v. Gillbanks
6
created the modem representation of the common-law presumption in
favor of free assembly. In Beatty, the local authorities prevented a
march by the appellant and others who were members of the Salvation
Army after their peaceful procession encountered violent opposition
from an antagonistic group. The key question for the court, on appeal,
was the propriety of the so-called "Hecklers Veto:" Whether the
violence of their opponents (the "Skeleton Army") could effectively veto
the Salvationists' freedom of assembly. The answer was no. The court
reasoned that,
[w]hat has happened here is that an unlawful organization has assumed to itself
the right to prevent the appellants and others from lawfully assembling together,
and the finding of the justices amounts to this, that a man may be convicted for
doing a lawful act if he knows that his doing it may cause another to do an
unlawful act. There is no authority for such a proposition.
87
However, in the United Kingdom, free assembly is by no means
absolute. Several factors, that in many respects are quite unique, contour
the right. First, the need for public order conditions assemblies that
threaten public peace and tranquillity.88 Second, the right of others to
use public streets and highways, or the right of passage, provides both
justification for, and a limitation to, free assembly in the form of street
demonstrations and marches. 9 Third, and perhaps most significantly,
English law allows the balancing of these competing rights to be
undertaken by the police and local administrators."°
While the Beatty decision represents the high-water mark for freedom
of assembly in Britain, more recent cases have diluted the strength of
this language by striking a balance between free assembly, the right to
passage, and the public order, expressed as follows: "[C]ourts have long
recognized the right to free speech to protest on matters of public
concern and to demonstrate on the one hand, and the need for peace and
good order on the other." 9' As applied, the balance seems to favor public
86. 9 Q.B.D. 308 (1882).
87. Id. at 314.
88. See infra Part IV.A.
89. See infra Part IV.A.
90. See infra Part IV.B.
91. Hirst and Agu v. Chief Constable of West Yorks, 85 Cr. App. R. 143, 151
(1987).
order. The paramount concern is social harmony, not the free exercise
of individual liberty. 92 Thus, one commentator remarked that "[t]he
maintenance of the Queen's peace is perceived as the primary function
of the law."93
After Beatty, courts articulated compelling public order justifications
for giving the authorities the power of prior restraint to restrict or ban
potentially violent or disorderly assemblies in advance. In a case
decided just after Beatty, the Irish appellate court94 acknowledged the
existence of a heckler's veto. The court upheld a decision by a
magistrate to disperse an otherwise peaceful meeting in order to prevent
an attack by its opponents. The officer's paramount duty was to
preserve the peace by whatever means were available for the purpose:
Accordingly, in the present case, even assuming that the danger to the public
peace arose altogether from the threatened attack of another body on the
plaintiff and his friends, still, if the defendant believed and had just grounds for
believing that the peace could only be preserved by withdrawing the plaintiff
and his friends from the attack with which they were threatened, it was I think
the duty of the defendant to take that course.95
Thus, the officer's "paramount duty was to preserve the peace
unbroken, and that by whatever means were available for the purpose."
96
This tug-of-war between free assembly and public order is replicated
in nearly every liberal democracy. An absolute guarantee of assembly
would be chaotic and anarchistic. At the same time, a total
preoccupation with peace would be politically stifling and authoritarian.
In several countries, including the U.S., a legal compromise is reached
by guaranteeing a right of assembly, qualified by exceptions.97 In Britain
and Northern Ireland, by contrast, the law does not favor assembly as a
positive right. The emphasis is instead on the freedom to assemble as a
negative liberty; as something citizens are free to do to the extent that
they are not restricted by any law, whether administrative, statutory, or
92. See Gearty, supra note 2, at 41.
93. Id. Gearty notes:
The law on Public order has to be wide enough to catch the rioters, the
hooligans, the disorderly football fans, and the aggressive drunkards. But it
necessarily also extends to people who have gathered together in pursuit of
their freedom to assemble ... large protests have often degenerated into
looting and criminal damage, and even well-organized pickets have on
occasion become pitched battles between strikers and workers.
Id.
94. Ireland was under direct rule by Westminster at this time in history.
95. O'Kelly v. Harvey, 15 Cox CC 435, 445-46 (1883).
96. Id. at 446.
97. See NEIL JARMEN, ET AL., POLITICS IN PUBLIC: FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND THE
RIGHT TO PROTEST-A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, pt. 3, § 1 (1998) (excerpt available at
<http://cain.ulst.ac.ukl/dd/report8/report8.htm>). The authors cite the jurisdictions of
Canada, Ireland, Italy, South Africa and the United States for this proposition. Id.
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judge-made."
Further contouring the right of free assembly in British common law is
the concept of the right of passage. According to Vorspan, "[t]he right
of passage is arguably the only positive right recognized in English
common law."99  The justifications for this right have served as
boundaries for the expressive mediums of demonstrations and
processions. While in its earliest stages, the right served to restrict public
demonstrations.'0° Later, through various social movements' reliance on
protest marches, the right seemed to merge with free assembly at least as
far as parades and processions were concerned."' Like freedom of
assembly, the right of passage is linked to public order, yet unlike free
assembly, the right of passage is also limited by the simultaneous exercise
of the right by others.
Essentially, English common law evolved to recognize the public's
right to use the highways "reasonably" and "free from obstruction."'' 2
Both qualifiers significantly affected the legality of all forms of street
activity. The right to passage originated in the Middle Ages and was
derived from two features of the English concept of highway. First, the
highway was considered to be an easement over private property rather
than a road.'03 Second, highways were private property even though they
might be "owned" by the Crown rather than a private party. "  By the
eleventh century, most major roads were known as "King's Highways.' 0 5
The right of passage incorporated two further concepts: "reasonable use"
and "obstruction." Thus, using the street in a manner both obstructive and
unreasonable was considered an illegal exercise of the right of passage
and contrary to the public good.'°6
Through its evolution, however, the English government invoked the
right of passage to mask its attempts to suppress unpopular speech.
98. See id. "Rights exist only at .common law in so far as that which is not
prohibited or restricted is permitted. It has been suggested that any constitutional
settlement in Northern Ireland should include a Bill of Rights." Id.
99. Rachel Vorspan, Freedom Of Assembly and The Right To Passage In Modern
English Legal History, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 921, 923 (1997).
100. See infra Part IV.A.
101. See infra Part IV.A.
102. See Harrison v. Duke of Rutland, I Q.B. 142 (1893); Hickman v. Maisey, 1
Q.B. 752 (1900).
103. See Vorspan, supra note 99, at 927.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 927-28.
106. See id. at 930 (citing Harrison v. Duke of Rutland, 1 Q.B. 142 (1893); and
Hickman v. Maisey, I Q.B. 752 (1900).
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, outdoor rallies and processions
became increasingly important forms of political expression, thus a right
implicating the permissible uses of the streets became a cornerstone of the
regulation of popular protests.' 7  "If applied restrictively, nuisance
doctrines defining street demonstrations as 'obstructions' to passage could
easily become devices for inhibiting freedom of assembly. Thus, in the
late 1880's, the British Government used right of passage concepts in an
effort to muffle increasing grass-roots social movements while
maintaining a sense of political neutrality.'O By invoking the public's
right to pass along the Highway unobstructed, the authorities were able to
appear politically indifferent, and maintained steadfastly that they were
prosecuting criminal acts rather than effectively suppressing political
speech." ° By classifying demonstrations or processions as obstructions,
authorities disclaimed responsibility for arrests and prosecutions by
contending that local police, and not the government, had the discretion to
prosecute such charges."' For example, local authorities relied upon
obstruction charges to suppress unpopular Salvation Army street
meetings.'
2
While street demonstrations interfered with the public's right to pass
along the hi3hway, the right of passage simultaneously justified street
processions. Because obstruction law was premised upon the public's
107. See Vorspan, supra note 99, at 944-47.
108. Vorspan, supra note 99, at 924. Obstruction Law employed the right of passage
to justify prosecuting those responsible for street gatherings that were considered nuisances
or "obstructions." Id.
109. See id.
110. See Vorspan, supra note 99, at 945-46.
Ill. See id. at 946-47. Vorspan notes as an example:
[I]n 1882 the Liberal Home Secretary, William Harcourt, maintained that he
could do no more than "offer advice" about obstruction prosecutions as he had
no authority over constables or magistrates. Two years later, when Booth sent
a blistering memo to the Home Office charging that the Worthing magistrates
had consistently refused to issue summonses to opponents of the Salvation
Army, Harcourt again insisted that he lacked power over the local authorities.
Id.
112. See id. at 962-63. Obstruction law proved even more significant in suppressing
the socialist movement.
Indeed, the Salvationists commanded considerable sympathy from the public,
the courts, and the central government for the abuse inflicted on them by the
Skeletons and provincial officials. In contrast, the meetings of the unemployed
in the heart of London were part of a radical political campaign that, while
perhaps not perceived as revolutionary, nonetheless generated pervasive and
acute public alarm. Differing social threats, differing public pressures, and
differing governmental responses accentuated and entrenched the conceptual
bifurcation in legal doctrine.
Id. For an excellent articulation of suppression of the Socialist movement, see id. at 962-
76.
113. See R. v. Carlile 6, C. & P. 636, 172 Eng. Rep. 1397 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1834).
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right to proceed on the highway, the legal machinery could not possibly
prevent the free passage of such groups on the "King's Highway."
Processions, or "moving demonstrations," presented a complex problem.
For arguably political reasons, the distinction between meetings and
processions had evolved into a recognition that because marches were
exercises of the right to passage, they deserved protection." 4  Thus,
demonstrators, as members of the public, could rely upon the right to pass
in order to conduct political processions on the public roads. Though the
principles of obstruction remained available to suppress street meetings of
the Salvation Army and the Socialists, applying these principles to street
processions was logically difficult.
Accordingly, the right of the State to maintain public order in the
context of public processions required clarification."' The paradox
posed by the justification of the right to parade simultaneously required
protection of the right of others to also pass unobstructed. In the early
1930's, marches and counter marches strained the patience of the
English public, and the local authorities faced increasing logistical
difficulties in maintaining the peace." 6 These dilemmas fueled demand
for a centralizing statute that would supersede local regulation and bring
the issue of prior restraints within an authoritative national framework. "'
To meet these demands, Parliament enacted the Public Order Act
1936. "'
The Public Order Act 1936 gave the police expansive new powers,"'
114. See Vorspan, supra note 99, at 950.
115. See id. at 990.
116. See id. at 998.
117. See id. at 991-99.
118. See Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8, 1 Geo. 6, ch. 6 (Eng.). Under
subsection 3(1), a chief of police could impose restrictions on a procession if he had
reasonable grounds for apprehending "serious public disorder." This provision was
relatively non-controversial because it only generalized powers that the police already
exercised in many parts of the country. Under 3(2), if a police chief was "of opinion"
that imposing conditions would be insufficient to prevent serious disorder, he could
apply to the local council for a ban on all public processions, or any specified class of
processions, in a particular area for a period of up to three months. See id. §3. The Act
confers upon authorities the same powers found in the Public Order (Northern Ireland)
Order, 1987, S.I. 1987 No. 463.
119. See Vorspan, supra note 99, at 1000. As Vorspan notes, after the Act went
into effect,
[T]he Metropolitan Police Commissioner banned all political marches in the
East End for six weeks and renewed the restriction at intervals thereafter.
There was, in fact, an almost continuous ban on processions in London from
1937 until after World War 1I. As a result of the Act, paramilitary marches
but did not correct the traditional problem of administrative deference.
The Public Order Act 1936 (and all subsequent Public Order acts) did
not address the fundamental problem that discretion to restrict the right
of passage and free assembly remained with the police."" Thus, the
police could continue to use the power selectively based on the ideology
of the group seeking to assemble. Even worse, advocates of unpopular
speech had little judicial recourse. Courts refused to treat selective
prosecution as a legally cognizable defense.'2'
B. Recent Developments
Beginning in the mid 1970s, a conceptual separation of the right to
protest and the right of passage gained acceptance.'22 The deference paid
to street processions over street demonstrations began to fade, and
proponents of public order advocated a new qualifier to add to the
existing requirements of reasonable and non-obstructing use of the
Highway. This new requirement was called "Purpose of Use" and was
explained as follows:
There is a conflict of interest between those who seek to use the streets for the
purpose of passage and those who seek to use them for the purpose of
demonstration. English law recognizes as paramount the right of passage: a
demonstration which obstructs passage along the highway is unlawful.
2 3
Thus, two people could be walking down a street with different
purposes for doing so, and these purposes would characterize the
lawfulness of each person's conduct. The person who was headed for
the train station could proceed on her way because she was exercising
her affirmative right of passage. Yet, the person who was protesting
nuclear energy would be accorded less protection in the exercise of her
soon disappeared from English life.
Id.
120. See Public Order Act, 1936, § 3(l).
121. For example, in Arrowsmith v. Jenkins, 2 Q.B. 567 (1963), a peace activist was
charged with and convicted of obstruction because the anti-nuclear demonstration she
organized partially obstructed a highway. On appeal she argued that she had "lawful
authority" for the obstruction because the police had previously condoned the use of the
particular street for open-air meetings. Paying deference to the authority of the police
and local magistrates in such matters, the court expressly announced that police apparent
consent to similar meetings did not confer "lawful authority" on Arrowsmith's actions.
Id.
122. The catalyst for the reassessment was the riot in London's Red Lion Square in
1974, in which one person died and numerous participants and police officers were
injured. The riot resulted from the collision of marches of two antagonistic. groups. See
Vorspan, supra note 99, at 1013.
123. Id. at 1014, (citing REPORT OF INQUIRY BY THE RT. HON. LORD JUSTICE
SCARMAN INTO THE RED LION SQUARE DISORDERS OF 15 JUNE, 1974, 1975, cmnd. 5919,
at para. 122).
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right to protest. 24 Ordinary use of the streets was to be accorded more
protection than political use.1
25
This reformulation of the "right to passage" was codified in the
implementation of new public order legislation. In 1980, rising public
alarm 26 at an apparent epidemic of domestic violence sparked official
inquiries into the effectiveness of existing public order controls.' 27 The
resulting Public Order Act 1986 changed the 1936 Act. First, procession
organizers had to give written notice to police at least six days before the
processions were due to take place.' 28  Second, the Act expanded the
criteria for imposing restrictions on parades. In addition to the grounds
allowed under the 1936 Act,' 29 police could restrict a procession under a
number of new grounds as follows: (1) if it creates the apprehension of
serious public disorder; (2) where the purpose of a protest is the
intimidation of others "with a view to compelling them not to do an act
they have a right to do, or to do an act they have a right not to do;" or (3)
where the police reasonably believe that a procession is likely to cause
"serious damage to property" or "serious disruption to the life of the
community."'3  The police could only restrict time, place, route or
124. Distinguishing the right of passage from the right to demonstrate based upon
the motivations of the traveler is logically troubling. Consider the case of a political
activist that travels upon a road in order to reach a demonstration in a different town.
How is such a person different from another activist that "parades" upon a road to reach
a rally along with several other similar persons? A distinction based upon motivation
also breaks down when the notion of political motivation is unclear. For some persons,
the use of certain public streets by a group of Irish Catholics is a political statement,
while for others the same use may be merely an effort to enjoy the safety and
companionship of a group while traveling for non-political purposes.
125. See Vorspan, supra note 99, at 1014-15.
126. During the entire decade of the 1970s the police issued only eleven banning
orders in England. In the four year period from 1981-84 alone there were seventy-five.
See Vorspan, supra note 99, at 1026.
127. See id. at 1028.
128. See Public Order Act, 1986 ch. 64, § 11 (Eng.).
129. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
130. Public Order Act, 1986, §§ 12, 14. Neither 'intimidation' nor 'serious
disruption of life of the community' are defined in the Act. In a telling statement
outlining the possible factors police should take into consideration, Lord Denning
explained in the House of Lords why he supported the phrase "serious disruption to the
life of the community:"
I can illustrate the point by referring to the sometimes long and tedious
processions which obstruct the traffic and life of the community. A little while
ago I hired a cab to take me from Lincoln's Inn to Victoria Station and allowed
25 minutes for the purpose. But, lo and behold, when we got towards
Whitehall there was going along a procession of indefinite length, and I missed
my train. Surely that is, "serious disruption to the life of the community.
circumstances in which the procession will occur. If the Chief Constable
or Senior Officer believed that imposing conditions would be
inadequate, he or she could apply to the local town or district council for
a banning order. 3'
Courts continued to apply minimal scrutiny in reviewing the validity
of these orders.'32 For instance, the case of Kent v. Metropolitan Police
Commissioner,'33 reviewed a banning order that covered 786 square
miles and lasted for 28 days. The ban was issued shortly after large
scale rioting in Brixton in April 1981. The court found that the
processions previously conducted by the applicants "occasioned no
public disorder." The Court further stated that the Commissioner should
not have considered the likelihood that the procession would be used by
the organizers' antagonists as a pretext for causing public disorder.
Despite this broad pronouncement, the Court deferred to the judgment of
the Police Commissioner and affirmed the Commissioner's
determination, further highlighting the permissiveness of the
"Wendesbury Reasonableness Doctrine."'
34
Arguably then, legal protection of the public's right to free assembly
is left to the discretion of the police. As long as the police exercise their
discretion in a reasonable manner, the courts will defer to their judgment
regardless of the results. 35 For example, in one case, protesters occupied
a potential site for a nuclear power plant.13 The power company sought
to have the protesters removed, however, the police refused to do So.'3
Lord Denning believed the police had the authority to remove the
protesters if they chose to exercise this power, but decided that the
matter was "a policy decision with which the courts should not interfere
Police constables are no one's lackeys.' ' 38  Another judge was
emphatic that the "police on the spot must decide when to intervene.'
39
Such deference prompted one commentator to conclude that in this
Vorspan, supra note 99, at 1033 (citing 480 Parl. Deb., H.L. (6th ser.) 10-11
(October 6, 1986)).
Lord Denning's comments are significant in the fact that Denning served as an
Appellate Court judge during this debate and ruled in deference to the police on at least one
occasion. See Kent v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, Transcript (C.A. May 14, 1981). See
also Vorspan, supra note 99, at 1033.
131. See Public Order Act, 1986, § 13.
132. See Vorspan, supra note 99, at 1027.
133. Kent v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, Transcript (C.A. May 14, 1981).
134. See id. See also Vorspan, supra note 99, at 1027-28. See supra Part III for a
discussion of the Doctrine of Wednesbury Reasonableness.
135. See Gearty, supra note 2, at 67.
136. R. v. Chief Constable of the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, ex parte
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branch of civil liberties British citizens have freedom under the police
rather than freedom under the law.'4
In sum, the three most notable developments in English law with
respect to processions are: (1) a procession may be restricted if there is
reason to believe that it would cause public disorder; (2) since the right to
march is founded in part upon the public's right to pass freely along the
highway, a procession must not unduly restrain the rights of others to pass
along freely; and (3) the institutions charged with making these
"reasonableness" determinations are not the courts, but the local police
force and town council. In balancing the broad range of interests affected
by parades in England, such developments have created minimal legal or
social obstacles. In Northern Ireland, by contrast, the same obstacles
appear insurmountable.
V. HISTORY'S EFFECT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
NORTHERN IRELAND
The same police powers that govern the control of public processions
in England also apply to Northern Ireland. However, their effect in
Northern Ireland has been different as a result of the creation of a zero-
sum situation among the antagonistic groups. Northern Ireland, though
cut from the same cloth of common law, has an added twist. The
Province's history includes examples of the same governmental reliance
upon the heckler's veto as a pretext to suppress the free speech and
assembly rights of the minority. At the same time, however, when
majority groups, such as the Orangemen, march through minority
neighborhoods, raising the ire at Catholic residents, the principle behind
the heckler's vote is discredited as the unjust attempts of the few to
silence the voice of many.
The allowance of a contentious parade to proceed through a Catholic
neighborhood invariably sparks violent widespread Catholic protest; yet,
re-routing or banning an Orange parade elicits the same reaction from
the Protestant community. 4' Ironically, either choice, both rationally
140. See Gearty, supra note 2, at 55.
141. See SAVARIC, supra note 62, for a discussion of the events surrounding the
Drumcree parade in 1996. Prior to the parade, the RUC warned the Orangemen that they
would not be allowed down the Nationalist Garvaghy road. The RUC blockaded the
entrance to the road, and the Orange Order vowed to remain at the blockade until it was
lifted, thereafter, the members Protestant community set up road blocks throughout
Northern Ireland, essentially cutting off many Catholic areas, and waves of riots swept
based on preserving peace, leads to the public disorder that often
paralyzes all of Northern Ireland.
Although a part of the United Kingdom, civil liberties in Northern
Ireland have taken a distinct and distasteful path in their evolution. In
the seventy-five years of its history as a state, 42 Northern Ireland has
experienced nearly continuous violent upheaval, in part because of. the
clash between the right to protest and the need for public order. The
same factors that contoured the right of assembly in England,
exacerbated ancient animosity between the two communities, promoting
violence rather than peace. A look at the history of Northern Ireland will
shed some light on this paradox.
The importance of some consideration of the history surrounding the
conflict stems from the distance between most readers and the situation
in Northern Ireland. While Americans and others may be quite ill
informed about the reality of the situation in Northern Ireland at the
street level, America and other countries have played important roles in
the "Peace Process."" Common opinions regarding the current political
situation tend to be colored by a historical attachment to the Nationalist
opinions, as well as a concerted effort by Northern Ireland Nationalists
to tap into this "Irish" sentimentality. While the history of Northern
Ireland reflects a pattern of injustice and discrimination that offends
modern ideas of fairness, the judgment of outsiders must be tempered by
an awareness that our societies have also been built upon racial and
ethnic discrimination that we have yet to fully rectify. The history of the
United States renders judgments by its citizens .particularly self-
righteous. As such, the current position of both the Nationalist and
Loyalist communities in Northern Ireland cannot be evaluated solely by
regrettable periods in history; rather, history must be explored in order to
determine effective ways to better conform reality to our modern notions
of fairness and justice.
The history of Northern Ireland is the history of a society divided
between those who consider themselves Irish and those who consider
many Loyalist neighborhoods. The RUC eventually succumbed to the Loyalist pressure
and allowed the parade to proceed. Immediately thereafter, Catholics throughout the
Province expressed their rage at the RUC's about face and staged massive
demonstrations that eventually led to large-scale rioting. See id.
142. The formal state of Northern Ireland is quite young compared to the English
state and is therefore legally and culturally shaped by the centuries of English presence
and government in Ireland.
143. To refer to discussions of the issues of public order, the right to pass, and
administrative discretion, see supra at Part IV.A.
144. See infra Part IX. The involvement of the international community has
resulted in a significant peace dividend in the form of increased foreign investment and
tourism in Northern Ireland.
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themselves British. Colonial history has left Northern Ireland with a
legacy shared by many of the world's trouble spots: the problem of the
double minority. Within their own enclave of Northern Ireland,
Protestants outnumber Catholics by a ratio of five to four.14 However,
in the wider context of Ireland, Protestants are easily outnumbered by a
ratio of three to one. 46  As expressed by one commentator, "[t]he
inevitable and disastrous result was the advent of a ruling establishment
with the reins of power in its hands but acting under the stresses of a
besieged minority.' ' 47  Thus, two competing, and often mutually
exclusive, traditions formed at the extremes, Catholic Nationalism and
Protestant Loyalism. The clash of these two cultures created a polarized
population, the consequences being social and civil instability, and
repeated periods of violent conflict. The problem with the standard
explanations for violence is they fail to explain how small terrorist
factions have captured the support of two otherwise civil communities. 
' 48
As one commentator recognized, "the gunmen would have passed into
oblivion by now were they not sustained by entrenched social and
political structures.
For all of its political life, Northern Ireland was ruled by a single
party, invariably consumed with the single issue of maintaining the
relationship with Britain and preserving the border with the Irish
republic to the south. Any real attempt at political or social change has
been swamped by this obsession. As a result, Northern Ireland suffers
from "a deep psychosis in which rational thought and action are
inevitably overtaken by emotional spasms the moment it comes under
stress."'5
The metaphysical truth of historical fact is significant to the conflict in
Northern Ireland, but its importance is often exaggerated. Each
community's rendition of history supports respective claims of moral
right, and fosters mutual consternation. It is impossible for nine hundred
years of history to pass without embellishment, and therefore the author
145. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 87. According to the 1991 census, the
population of Northern Ireland was 38.4% Roman Catholic, and 50.7% percent
Protestant. See id.
146. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 3.
147. Id.
148. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 3. Jarmen generally answers this question by
asserting that paramilitary groups have appealed to "abstract ideals of nationality and the
precedent of history." Id.
149. MACDONALD, supra note 28, at ix.
150. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 3.
cannot guarantee the perfect accuracy of the history contained herein,
but can only report on those facts that are widely agreed to be true
among thoughtful commentators. In truth, history as retold, while
embellished and selectively remembered, is perhaps more important to
the antagonistic groups and is more essential for an understanding of the
current conflict and parade issues. Selective memory and affinity to
historic social and political divisions results in a powerful phenomenon
in which living individuals conceptualize themselves as the most recent
extension of a long and painful history. Mythical as well as legendary
heroes have assumed a sort of immortality, so that the passage of nearly
nine hundred years of history is felt by the current participants to have
occurred within their own lifetimes.'5 ' While each community has its
immortal heroes, each community similarly feels that ancient atrocities,
suffered at the hands of the other, occurred within the current generation.
This collective memory phenomenon results in an odd cartoonish sense
that time has stood still; contemporary Orangemen feel themselves to
march alongside their orange forefathers, while contemporary
Nationalist neighborhood groups feel themselves to stand with the
nationalist rebels and protesters of the last four hundred years to oppose
such marches.'52 This time warp of history has blinded each community
to its own dark acts. No one group may benefit from the support of
moral right, yet both communities continue to proclaim their moral
authority. "The fact that each community's fears are often based on
incorrect assumptions does not mean that they are any less strongly
felt.""' As a result, for both participants and witnesses, parades are not
mere expressions of political and social arguments. Instead, they must
be understood as the collective action of the past and the present upon
the living. The emotional power of the parade vastly complicates its
legal regulation and political importance.
A. Early Roots
Irish history passed through three stages in a period that stretched
from the Elizabethan conquests to partial independence, culminating
with Partition in 1921-22. The first stage was that of conquest, marked
151. See infra note 152.
152. Jarmen refers to this as "social memory." He states: "The writing of history is
concerned with imposing some sense of narrative and direction on the past, while a
collective memory is more concerned with emphasising the sense of repetition, of
situating the event or experience within a pre-existing category." See JARMEN, supra
note 15, at 4, 6-10. Thus, ritual parading not only links the present participants to the
past, but "re-deifies" past heroes and martyrs, helping to cause the phenomenon of the
past living in the present while the present simultaneously lives in the past. See id.
153. Id. at 3.
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by England defeating Irish resistance militarily, challenging cultural
authorities, and seizing the land.'54  The second stage was that of
consolidation. Through repressive legislation, the Crown attempted to
dismantle Gaelic culture and to assimilate the native Irish into the
colonial society that Northern Ireland had become.'55 The final stage
was that of reform. Failing to squelch the native Irish culture, England
attempted to equalize the population through social reform.'56 However,
Protestants resisted such attempts and their reluctance, along with other
factors, led Britain to divide Ireland into two states in order to preserve
the colonial system existing in the North.
During the first stage, England more or less conquered and occupied
Ireland for strategic reasons: Ireland's importance to Britain rested in the
fact that Ireland was Britain's left flank.' But because the Reformation
culturally split the British Isles, the occupation of Ireland had taken on a
religious tone.'58 The Irish, which included the Norman conquerors of
the l100's "'59 and the "old" Irish, as the descendants of the original
settlers became known, continued to follow the Roman Catholic Church.
This religious difference added to a paranoia in England of disloyalty
from within, especially relating to England's conflicts with continental,
and often Church-backed, European powers.160
154. See infra Part V.
155. See infra Part V.A.
156. See infra Part V.A.
157. During the late 1500's the ships of the Spanish Armada anchored off the West
Coast of Ireland and received assistance from the native Anglo-Irish lords much to
Queen Elizabeth's dismay. The subsequent tightening of British control under Cromwell
was meant to secure the loyalty of the native population. See BARDON, supra note 29, at
89-98. Coogan points out that due to geopolitical rivalries between England, Spain and
France, Ireland posed the threat of a strategic and sympathetic ally to England's enemies.
He refers to Ireland's relation to England during this period as a "green Cuba." COOGAN,
supra note 10, at 5. See also MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 21.
158. See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 5-6. See also BARDON, supra note 31, at 132,
who notes that Franciscans and other European priests, "instilled a new zeal amongst Old
English and Native Irish Catholics alike; in Ulster, therefore, the uncompromising spirit
of the Counter-Reformation faced the inflexible determination of the Puritan settlers.
Hostility, suspicion and uncertainty created a dangerously unstable atmosphere of fear in
the province." Id.
159. The Norman Invaders made up the backbone of the Irish Aristocracy, and
though considered the Royal authority in Ireland, they had become more Irish than the
Irish themselves. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 34.
160. After William the Conqueror's departure from Ireland, the Protestant Settlers,
who retained administration of Ireland, generally believed that 'Catholic' equaled
'treacherous.' See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 6. See also BARDON, supra note 31, at 91-
114.
The Elizabethan conquest of Ireland in the late 1500's was followed
by the first colonial plantation of Ulster.161 In the early 1600's, James I
embarked on a system designed to ensure loyalty to the Crown. He set
out to replace what remained of the native population with loyal British
subjects. 162 However, the influx of English settlers failed to eradicate the
native population as influxes of settlers had eradicated native peoples
elsewhere in the world. When the initial settlement of Ulster faltered,'
63
the Ulster Irish wreaked savage vengeance on the Planters in 1641.'
6
The English Civil War and the frequency of native uprisings in Ireland
"authorized" Cromwell's subsequent re-conquest of Ireland in the mid to
late 1600's and his ensuing military campaigns and land confiscation
against the native Catholic Population.' 65 At the end of the re-conquest,
Ireland's Protestant aristocrats and landlords firmly held the island's
land and its political power.6
Waves of Protestants, mostly Scottish Presbyterians, emigrated to the
six counties of modem Northern Ireland, under the restored system of
Plantation. Because resistance to conquest was stiffest in the northeast,
England concentrated its seventeenth century plantation efforts in Ulster,
hoping to solve its Irish problem by uprooting the native Catholic
population.' 67 The planters with the biggest holdings were forbidden to
have Irish tenants. Smaller estate holders were permitted to take Irish
tenants but, if they did, their rents were increased. 68 The colonizers of
Northern Ireland never fully drove out or defeated the "natives," so that
Ulster became what it is today, a province of two mutually antagonistic
populations. 69 Spurned on by the loss of ancestral lands, the native Irish
161. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 124.
162. The conditions for Plantation required that Planters take an "oath of
supremacy," that is, the Planters had to be Protestant. See BARDON, supra note 31, at
125.
163. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 132-34.
164. See id. at 135-37.
165. See id. at 140-42. As Jarmen notes, "in 1641, the Irish rebelled under Rory
O'More, and in many places revenge was taken and settlers were put to the sword. But
retribution followed, as Oliver Cromwell arrived in Ireland in 1649 and slaughtered,
confiscated lands, and banished Irish landowners to the barren western area of
Connacht." JARMEN, supra note 15, at 32.
166. See Roger Myers, A New Remedy For Northern Ireland: The Case For United
Nations Peacekeeping Intervention In An Internal Conflict, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 17 (1990). "By 1703, the Protestant ascendancy was complete: native
Catholics owned less than 14 % of all of Ireland, and in eight of Ulster's nine counties,
Protestants owned 95 % of the land." Id.
167. This strategy was remarkably similar to the promotion of Settlerism in the
United States as a method to reduce the power of Native Americans. See id. at 16.
168. See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 6.
169. See id. To accomplish these ends as cheaply as possible, England employed
Protestant settlers to serve as surrogates for British royal authority. See also
MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 21-23.
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aristocracy reacted to the plantation system with sporadic uprisings
throughout the 1600's. T0 However, the Plantation of Ulster flourished,
despite social instability, until the accession of the Catholic James II to
the English throne in 1685. T'
James II assumed executive power in England and began to restore
Catholics to public positions throughout the Kingdom.17 This "rebirth"
of the Catholic ascendancy in England prompted several leading
Protestants to request the Dutch Protestant William Prince of Orange toS 171
invade England and restore the Protestant monarchy. Upon William's
arrival in England, James fled to Ireland where he rallied his supporters
with the help of a formidable French army. 7' Fearing a replay of the
1641 rebellion, Ulster's Protestant Lords raised militias to defend
against the Catholic forces.'75 Soon, Jacobite armies, as King James'
Catholic supporters were known, mounted a rather successful campaign
against the Protestant ascendancy, and Ireland nearly fell under the
complete control of the Catholic King James. 176 However, two important
Protestant "victories" took place, reversing Catholic gains, and had a
lasting effect upon the population of present day Northern Ireland.
The first important event was the Siege of Derry, which would
become a historical metaphor for the Protestant culture and sensibilities
in Ireland. 7 7 In December 1688, a Catholic regiment marched toward
the city of Derry, but before they could cross the river Foyle, thirteen
"Apprentice Boys" raised the drawbridge and closed the gates in front of
the advancing army.' Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Lundy, the military
governor of Derry, ordered a general withdrawal of Protestant garrisons
to the walled city.79 Thereafter, Jacobite armies took up positions
around Derry, cutting the city off. Catholic forces enjoyed military
successes against retreating Protestant garrisons aided by Lundy's
possible hesitance in repelling the Jacobite armies, if not his outright
complicity with the Catholic campaigners.8 Soon, belief in Lundy's
170. See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 6. See also BARDON, supra note 31, at 145-47.
171. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 148-49.
172. See id. at 150.
173. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 32.
174. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 150-52.
175. See id. at 152.
176. See id. at 153.
177. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 76.
178. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 152.
179. See id. at 153.
180. See id. at 154. See also JARMEN, supra note 15, at 78 n. 1.
betrayal became widespread and he was overthrown.18' Although near
starvation, the people of Derry withstood the 105 day siege, and in July
of 1689, English forces sailed up the river and successfully broke the- 82
Jacobite nng. This epic defense gave Ulster Protestants inspiration, as
well as a constant perception of being besieged by the native Catholics,
for more than three centuries to come.'83 Each summer, the Apprentice
Boys mark the Relief of Derry by parading the walls of the ancient city,
and to this day, to be called a "Lundy," a traitor to one's own people, is a
"withering insult" in the Protestant community. 84
The next year, buoyed by their victory and the establishment of a
home base at Derry, William of Orange landed in Ireland to lead his
army against the Jacobites.'85 The two armies met at the River Boyne on
July 1, 1690, and though the "Battle of the Boyne" was not decisive, the
Irish armies were driven south and James fled Ireland for France.'86 A
year later, on July 12, 1691, William's forces struck the final blow
against the Jacobites at the Battle of Aughrim, which consolidated the
Protestant "Glorious Revolution."'87  While the Battle of Aughrim
marked final victory, "the symbolic importance of the two monarchs
leading their armies into battle, and James's defeat and subsequent flight
from Ireland meant that the Battle of the Boyne would be remembered as
the key event" in Protestant culture.
88
Despite English and Protestant victory, the English settlers were
dissatisfied with their tenuous hold of power and a had a general feeling
of insecurity brought on by periodic rebellions of the seventeenth
181. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 154.
182. See id. at 157.
183. See id. at 158. See also JARMEN supra note 15, at 76.
Londonderry has long been the most potent symbolic place in Ulster for
unionists, and the story of the siege remains the most powerful metaphor of
Protestant sensibilities in Ireland. The narrative is used to illustrate the need
for decisive action, the unity in adversity; and it can be used as a justification
for resistance to the law. It is also used as a warning of the danger of
compromise and to justify fear of the traitor within. Parading the walls of
Derry is not just about maintaining tradition and celebrating loyalist culture, it
is also about reaffirming the principles on which Protestant power was
structured in Ulster: never trust the enemy within, exclude them from power
and authority. But Derry is also a city in which Catholics have long been the
majority. Under Stormont, gerrymandering of the local government wards
ensured that Unionists retained control of the city council. The city therefore
had a special significance for the nationalists too: it was a symbol of their
second class status in Northern Ireland.
Id.
184. Id. at 78 n.1, 117.
185. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 162.
186. See BARDON, supra note 31 at 163-64.
187. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 32-33. See also BARDON, supra note 31, at 164.
188. JARMEN, supra note 15, at 32-33.
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century, so the settlers attempted to assimilate the native population.
Thus begun the second stage of Irish colonialism. The Crown's local
administration, following the Protestant aristocracy's lead, attacked any
and all Irish institutions that preserved the coherence of Irish traditions
by enacting a series of repressive laws. 8 9 The "Penal laws,"'9 as they
were known, were enacted with the purpose to assimilate the native Irish
population into the Protestant kingdom by making the practice of
Catholicism unlawful, in order to remove "the 'Romish' influence from
the countryside."'' However the Penal laws were not as successful as
was hoped. The laws drove both the Catholic Church and its followers
underground and reinforced the importance of the Church to the native
Irish. 92
Protestant attempts to assimilate the native Catholic population had
the effect of ensuring Catholic disloyalty, creating a sort of "job
security" for the Protestant aristocracy whose duties included
maintaining civil authority over the dissenting natives. ' "Unfortunately
for Protestants, this led to seemingly constant agrarian violence, bloody
'native' uprisings,' 9 94 as well as the start of grass-roots political
movements, which eventually necessitated social reforms.
189. The Penal Law began,
Whereas it is Notoriously known, that the late Rebellions in this Kingdom
have been Contrived, Promoted and Carried on by Popish Archbishops,
Jesuits, and other Ecclesiastical Person of the Romish Clergy. And forasmuch
as the Peace and Publick Safety of this Kingdom is in Danger. . .which said
Romish Clergy do, not only endeavour to withdraw his Majesty's Subjects
from their Obedience but do daily stir up, and move Sedition, and Rebellion, to
the great hazard of the Ruine and Desolation of this Kingdom.
BARDON, supra note 31, at 168. See also Myers, supra note 166, at 17-18.
190. Under the Penal laws, Catholics could do none of the following: vote or hold
any administrative, judicial or political office; join the bar; teach at or attend the
university; establish their own schools; own land or a horse worth more than five
pounds. All Catholic bishops and higher church officials were banished from the
country and executed upon return. Myers, supra note 166, at 18.
191. Edmund Burke was said to describe the penal code as a, "machine of wise and
elaborate contrivance and as well fitted for the oppression, impoverishment and
degradation of a people, and the debasement in them of human nature itself, as ever
proceeded from the perverted ingenuity of man." COOGAN, supra note 10, at 7.
192. See Meyers, supra note 166, at 18. The church's grip on the Irish remains
unshaken to this day, effectively undermining proposals for political resolutions to the
Irish problem, since northern Protestants fear that inclusion in the Republic of Ireland
would force them into a theocracy historically opposed to Protestant social beliefs and
traditional English liberties such as secular education, divorce, abortion, and birth
control. See id.
193. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 54.
194. Id.
In order to restore some sense of stability, Britain enacted a series of
reforms including Catholic Emancipation, land reform, disestablishment
of the Church of England, and eventually Home Rule.'95 These reforms
of the third stage were designed to level the playing field, but only
widened the gap between Irish Catholics and English Protestants, and
started the fissure between Crown and its surrogates in Ireland.
Colonialism is based on privileges and deprivations, not rights. As
MacDonald argues, "for Catholics to receive effective citizenship would
at once have blurred the contrast between native and settler, and
undercut the rationale for settler supremacy."'' 96 Originally, Protestants
had rejected cooperation because Catholic demands were considered too
radical, but later rejected egalitarianism on principle.' 97  Thus, as
MacDonald argues, Protestants resisted Britain's proposals that
contemplated any change in Ireland's social and political order to
include loyal Catholics.'" The idea was that as long as the natives were
restless, someone needed to be on hand to quell insurrection, and thus
the Protestant role as governor in Ireland was secure. Hoping the
problem would simply go away, the British government left the colonial
system in place for most of the 19th century, cementing within Catholics
the perception of British and Protestant indifference to their plight.' 99
The segregation of English settlers and Irish natives survived well into
the twentieth century. The Partition of Ireland in 1920-21 simply





199. Some commentators argue that an example of British indifference is found in
the British reaction to the Great Irish Famine of the mid to late 1840's. As a result of the
Great Famine of 1845-47, an estimated one million Irish died and another one million
emigrated to the United States. Landless, poor, and overly dependent upon the potato,
Catholics were disproportionately affected. Many commentators maintain that the
manner in which Catholics were forced to live and the slow reaction of the British
government to the crop failure contributed greatly to the magnitude of the disaster. A
commission established to investigate land holdings in Ireland reported in 1845: "In
many districts, their only food is the potato, their only beverage water ... their cabins are
seldom a protection against the weather ... a bed or a blanket is a rare luxury ... nearly
in all cases their pig and manure heap constitute their only property." See Blaine
Whipple, Ireland: Why They Left The Emerald Isle (available at
<http://www.heritagequest.com/genealogy/europe/features/html/ireland- .html>). Since
the British government concerned itself with Ireland only in the event of a threat to
English security, and since the famine actually had the opposite effect by reducing the
population of potential agitators against the Crown, London did little to ease the
situation, and did nothing substantial until 1847, too late to avert catastrophe. See id.
But see Conrad Jay Bladey, The Potato Famine In History (last visited Mar. 17, 2000)
<http://www.toad.net/-sticker/nosurrender/chistory.html>.
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and social relations, Partition institutionalized the original conflict.
2
1
From this dynamic sprouts a supportable generalization. "Politically, the
natives were Nationalists and the settlers unionists; socially, the
Nationalists were deprived and the unionists privileged; and religiously,
the deprived were Catholic and the privileged were Protestant. ''2°' With
the two communities mired in impasse, Britain, led by the liberal-
minded Gladstone, proposed a "neo-colonial" solution to a colonial
problem: a devolved Irish government, better known as "Home Rule. 2 2
But because the independence of Ireland jeopardized Protestant
hegemony, considering that Protestants were being significantly
outnumbered on the Island, Home Rule encountered the fierce
opposition of Unionists. Unionists believed Home Rule would lead to
"Rome Rule."
203
Fearing civil war, and a potential Protestant massacre at the hands of
Irish Nationalists, Britain proposed that Ireland be partitioned into two
states with separate devolved governments. The six counties in the
North were severed from the rest of Ireland, and became the present
state of Northern Ireland. °  With a Protestant majority by design,
Northern Ireland became the last refuge of Protestant domination in
Ireland.29'
While the colonial history of Northern Ireland is important for
understanding how Northern Ireland's divided society was formed, it
does not fully explain why the division continues to exist. Considering
the advent of the Industrial Revolution and the consequential rise of
class consciousness and social reform in the early part of the twentieth
century, one would expect that the importance of religious sectarianism
would have been overridden by the importance of economic divisions
between rich and poor. The ultimate failure of class unification in
Northern Ireland suggests that other factors beside religious differences
perpetuate sectarian conflict. Ultimately, as will be discussed below,
Unionists' loyalty to the Britain, Nationalists' contrasting disloyalty, and
200. See infra Part V.B.
201. MACDONALD supra note 28, at 54.
202. The Home Rule movement of the mid to late 19th century presented the British
government with a method to extricate itself from Ireland. See infra Part V.B.
203. See MACDONALD supra note 28, at 55. See also ARTHUR AUGHEY & DUNCAN
MoRRow, NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICS 4 (Arthur Aughhey & Dean Marrow, eds.
1996); BARDON, supra note 31, at 407.
204. See infra Part V.B.
205. See infra Part V.B.
the British government's attempts to distance itself from Northern
Ireland altogether created an atmosphere where two largely similar
communities, nominally separated by religion, remain locked in conflict.
B. Towards Partition
The Partition of Ireland into two devolved governments was Britain's
first step towards separating itself from Ireland. The act had the effect of
further disenchanting Irish Catholics. It also raised Protestant fears of
abandonment by the country to which they pledged their loyalty, with
the feared result being consequent envelopment of the Protestant state
into the Catholic Irish Republic to the south and the loss of Protestant
culture and advantages. Thus, ancient sectarian animosity and distrust
arguably reduced the impact in Northern Ireland of the socio-economic
upheaval experienced throughout much of the world at the time, despite
the rise of socialism and class consciousness in the beginning of the
twentieth century.
Still, in the aftermath of World War I, Belfast was rife with labor
agitation, especially among the most skilled sectors of the industrial
working class-the Protestant Shipyard workers. 20 By January 1919,
their demands erupted into a series of major strikes, which in turn led to
a short-lived Protestant working class defection to the Labour Party in
subsequent elections.2 °7
The traditionally conservative Unionist Party represented the interests
of Northern Ireland's industrialists and capitalists, and suffered directly
as a result of the temporary working-class defection from Protestant
conservatism. Fortunately for the Unionist Party, the political
independence of the Protestant working class was vulnerable to the
growing threat Republicans posed to all Protestants. Led by Charles
Stewart Parnell, Irish Nationalism became politicized and turned to the
ballot box first over the issue of land reform, then later over the issue of
a Home Rule Parliament for Ireland. °8 Parnell's Irish Parliamentary
Party became very influential at Westminster, eventually holding "the
balance of power in the governing assembly of the world's ... most
extensive empire.,,209 Gladstone's Liberal government, needing Parnell's
support to maintain control of Westminster, soon took up the cause of
devolution,20 and Ulster Unionists with the support of the Orange Order
206. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 463-64.
207. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 59.
208. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 369-80.
209. Id. at 375.
210. See id. at 375-76.
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allied with the Conservative Party in opposition to Home Rule.2 ' The
debate over Home Rule consumed Irish politics from the 1880's through
the 1920's and the people of Ireland took up opposing positions on the
issue as the rest of Europe marched towards the First World War.
To say that Ireland was polarized over the issue of Home Rule is an
understatement. Ulster Unionists rallied popular support against the
measure, going so far as to orchestrate the signing of the Solemn League
and Covenant in September 1912, where more than 250,000 Ulster
Protestants signed a document pledging themselves to use "all means
which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up
a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland. 212  Thereafter, Ulster Unionists
established the Ulster Volunteer Force, a paramilitary organization, with
100,000 members by some accounts,13 which began importing arms in
anticipation of civil war."4 In response, a movement among Irish
Nationalists militarized, emerging as the Irish National Volunteer Force.
The rebirth of militant Irish nationalism set the stage for the Easter
Rising of 1916.215
Before the Easter Rising, militant Nationalism did not enjoy popular
support. However, Britain's brutal repression of the Rising 16 delivered
the Irish population to the revolutionary Nationalist organization, Sinn
Fdin, which soon replaced the Irish Parliamentary Party as the dominant
Nationalist political party. 2 7 The Irish Volunteers renamed themselves
the Irish Republican Army, and soon thereafter, the IRA began a bloodyS • 218
guerrilla campaign against British influences throughout Ireland.
The Nationalist campaign for an independent republic only added to
these fears. Even though Republicans were relatively inactive in the
North, the backbone of the Republican Movement was its claim that the
six northeastern counties of Ireland were rightfully part of an
independent and united Ireland.2 9 The primary threat of a united and
211. See AUGHHEY & MARROW, supra note 203, at 4.
212. Id. at 5.
213. See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 18. Coogan also maintains that more than
470,000 persons signed the Ulster Covenant. See id.
214. See AUGHHEY & MARROW, supra note 203, at 5.
215. See id.
216. See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 22-23.
217. See AUGHHEY & MARROW, supra note 203, at 5. See also, COOGAN, supra
note 10, at 23-24.
218. See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 24.
219. This claim was embodied in the Republic's Constitution, articles 2 and 3. See
IR. CONST. preamble (Bunreacht na hEireann). The Constitution was not amended until
independent Ireland was that Catholics would become the overwhelming
majority in a new self-governed state. Not only would Protestants lose
citizenship in what they regarded as their rightful nation, but they also
would suffer economically in two ways. First, Belfast's industrial
economy was directly connected to the wider British economy so that
political separation from Britain meant the risk of a weakened economy
through the loss of British trade.2 Secondly, a weaker economy meant
the loss of Protestant jobs. Since Protestants generally were employed
in more and better jobs,22' integration into the independent and Catholic
Republic of Ireland meant social reform at the expense of Protestant• •• 222
privileges. Thus, Unionist elites were able to effectively use the threat
of a modern rebirth of a Catholic Ascendancy to "convert class-
conscious militancy into pro-colonial, anti-Catholic sectarianism." '
Such was the start of Ulster's dilemma of a zero-sum conflict.
Moreover, events during World War I only added to popular
Protestant apprehension of the Nationalist agenda. Just a few months
after Irish Nationalists staged the Easter rebellion against the Crown, a
British Army Division made up almost entirely of members of the
Protestant Ulster Volunteers was massacred at the Battle of the Somme
224in France. Thus, Unionist animosity towards Irish Nationalism was
further strengthened by the image of Nationalist treachery juxtaposed
against the great sacrifice paid by Ulster's loyal subjects in defense of
the Crown.225
In order to appease militant Irish Republicanism and similarly
committed Ulster Unionism, and to prevent an all-out blood bath, Britain
passed the Government of Ireland Act in 1920,226 establishing one home-
rule government 227 for the 26 southern counties, and another for the six
northern counties. However, Sinn Fdin was resolute in its anti-
1998 to remove the territorial claim. See infra note 451.
220. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 59.
221. For example, 90% of the lucrative and prestigious shipyard jobs were held by
Protestants. See id.
222. See id.
223. Id. The post-World War I global depression only added to Protestant working
class insecurity. In Ulster, unemployment reached 25% with a rise in sectarianism its
consequence. With soaring unemployment looming, Protestant workers decided better
them than us. In July 1920, Protestant workers, with the aid of the Unionist party, forced
the expulsion of 10,000 of Belfast's 90,000 Catholics from their jobs. The Protestant
working class restored its traditional allegiance to the Unionist Party. Thus, "the very
economic hardships that originally contributed to working-class militancy eventually
fueled sectarianism; Catholics became scapegoats for the downturns of the business
cycle." Id.
224. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 454-56.
225. See JARMEN, supra note 15, at 71.
226. Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 10211 Geo. 5, ch. 67 (Eng.).
227. The one home-rule government is known as "Stormont."
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compromise position over independence, and consequently, Irish
Nationalists split over Partition, eventually engaging in war over the
issue.228  Ulster Catholics, who were turned into captives of the
Protestant majority, dreaded the partition of Ireland, and soon the cause
of their apprehensions became clear. Undercover hit squads, drawn
from the British Army and Northern Ireland's new police force appeared
to be able to murder Catholics at will.229 Soon after, the election of a
Catholic mayor in Derry touched off riots that soon spread throughout
Northern Ireland.2 0 Thus, by the use of violence and intimidation, the
newly reformulated Protestant alliance between workers and elites
reaffirmed the "pecking order" in Northern Ireland: Protestant privileges
would remain intact at the cost of Catholic equality.
23'
The irony of Partition is that in the newly created Northern Ireland, the
minority-controlled colonial system with all of its inequalities suddenly
became a colonial system under majority control. While the
overwhelming majority in the South was Catholic and Nationalist,
Protestants constituted roughly two-thirds of the population in the
Northern six counties.
Partition reinforced the anomaly of minority rule in an apparently
democratic society. For hundreds of years in Ireland, the vast Catholic
masses were governed by the minority Protestant landowners.
Arguably, Partition democratically laundered the system of subjugation
of the majority to permanent minority rule. Ulster Protestants, who had
been quite accustomed to the colonial system, found themselves in the
ruling majority, and thus democratically justified in remaining the
politically and socially dominant community in the new State of
Northern Ireland.232
Arguably, Partition also indirectly sheltered Northern Ireland from the
divisiveness of social conflict, by increasing the influence of
sectarianism as a substitute motivating force. A brief digression clarifies
this point. To secure their continued loyalty to Unionism, Protestant
228. See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 25-26.
229. Id. at 26.
230. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 60.
231. See id. See also infra Part V.B-D.
232. See MAcDONALD, supra note 28, at 55-56. In 26 of Ireland's 32 counties
before Partition, Unionists lacked the base to prevent the rise of the Catholic elite, but in
Ulster, Unionists mobilized the Protestant majority to reject Home Rule for outright
colonialism. Colonialism derived its strength in Ulster from the pattern of the original
plantation. In most of Ireland, English settlers were few and scattered, but in Ulster, they
were numerous and concentrated. See id.
elites had conceded material privileges to the working class Protestants233
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.3 This reinforced
colonialism in two important ways. First, surpluses from the tightly
controlled agrarian economy eventually gave rise to an industrial
economy tied to the British markets. Thus, both the Protestant laboring
classes as well as the economic elites relied on the colonial connection
with Britain.
Second, the benefits generated by Ulster's economy were directed
disproportionately to Protestants. Class was arguably stratified along
colonial lines: the Protestant elites and industrialists formed the upper
class; the middle class was composed of the Protestant working class
and farmers with a few Catholic landowners and professionals thrown
in; and "on the bottom, menacing those above," was the Catholic
working class.235 The privileges, which generally consisted of more
available and better paying jobs, arguably provided Protestants with a
higher standard of living. Though not all Protestant workers clearly
benefited from the privileges generated by sectarianism, a substantial
portion of the Protestant working class developed a material stake in
supporting the colonial order that favored them over their historic
adversaries, reinforcing the legacy of antagonism separating Protestants
from Catholics.236
Social diversity within Unionism did, in fact, strain its cohesiveness.237
However, these internal fractures paled in comparison to sectarian strife
between Protestants and Catholics. In demanding political power,
Catholics threatened settler hegemony and the privileges accorded to the
Protestant laboring class, as well as the Protestant aristocracy.238
Thus, Unionists maintained popular Protestant support and
consequently political control over the government of Northern Ireland
233. Initially, these privileges were doled out under the system of State patronage
and later through the bequest of better jobs from Protestant industrialists.
234. See id. In fact, this point is the crux of MacDonald's argument that purposeful
sectarianism existed primarily to maintain unity within the Protestant community.
Arguably this system of patronage affected the 20th century as well. As Farrell argues, a
continuing pattern of discrimination in employment was evident as late as 1961. At that
time, the average unemployment figure for Northern Ireland was 7 %. The employment
exchange areas in Northern Ireland with the five highest rates of unemployment were
solidly Catholic; all nearly twice the average or more. The five lowest areas were solidly
Protestant; each have the average or lower. In Belfast, the average rate for the 14
Catholic districts was twice the overall average, with some districts registering in at 33
percent. MICHAEL FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE 91-92 (1976).
235. MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 55.
236. See id. at 59-60.
237. See id. at 63-64. As MacDonald notes, "In the city, workers and capitalists
disputed industrial issues, while in the countryside small landowners resented the
supremacy of the large ones." Id.
238. See id. at 64.
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by providing the Protestant working class with material privileges at the
expense of Catholics. However, in order to maintain "unity" within
Unionism, the Unionist leadership had to ensure that sectarian conflict
always took center stage over social and class conflict. To accomplish
this, the Unionist government at Stormont used its power to maintain, if
not widen the divide between Protestant and Catholic. Finding
themselves out of power, Catholic Nationalists suffered politically,
socially, and economically as a result.
C. The New Northern Ireland State and Its Police Powers
From its inception, the Northern Ireland State operated under some of
the most repressive legislation of any modern western democracy. On
April 7, 1922, the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act23 9 came into
force, which gave the government and the RUC unrestrained authority.
The Special Powers Act had been rushed through Stormont in April
1922 at the height of massive rioting in Belfast, and was intended to last
for only one year; however, it has continued to remain on the books in
one form or another and still endures today.240
The Special Powers Act conferred upon the government the absolute
power to do whatever was necessary to maintain public order. It
expressly provided for the introduction of the death penalty for some
offenses, for flogging and imprisonment for others, for the prohibition of
inquests, and for arrest without warrant.24' It also gave the Prime
Minister power to make further regulations, each with the force of law,
without consulting parliament.242 The Prime Minister could also delegate
his powers to any policeman at any time.43
Essentially, the "Home Secretary shall have power to do whatever he
likes, or let someone else do what he likes for him."2" The Act's
239. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 5 (Eng.). It
was an extraordinary Act. The first sentence reads:
The Civil Authority (the minister of Home Affairs) shall have power, in
respect of persons, matters and things within the jurisdiction of the
Government of Northern Ireland to take such steps and issue all such orders as
may be necessary for preserving the peace and maintaining order.
Id.
240. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 513.
241. See id. at 490.
242. See FARRELL, supra note 234, at 93.
243. See id.
244. BARDON, supra note 31, at 490. See also FARRELL, supra note 234, at 93. As
if the Special Powers Act were not enough, the Northern government later reinforced it
reputation in the political world is telling of its breadth. The then South
African Minister for Justice, when introducing a new coercion bill in the
South African Parliament in April 1963, commented that he "would be
willing to exchange all the legislation of that sort for one clause of the
Northern Ireland Special Powers Act.""2 '
In the tradition of British deference to the police with regards to
matters of public order, the newly created Stormont government charged
the RUC and the Special Constabulary with enforcement of these
draconian laws. However, unlike the rest of Great Britain, Stormont,
later termed "a Protestant government for a Protestant people, 246 had
incentives to provide for the biased enforcement of these laws to keep
Catholic Nationalists socially and politically impotent. Thus, armed
with immense and unchecked power, the RUC did little more than the
Unionist Party's bidding, for the Police in Northern Ireland began as,
and as Nationalists argue, continue to be, a Protestant and Loyalist
military force.
D. The Role of the Constabularies: The Police Issue
The composition of the police force may be the most important factor
leading to the differing treatment of unpopular expression between
Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. In the U.K., the constabulary
is considerably more representative of the society at large than the RUC
in Northern Ireland. Though reforms have recently attempted to alter the
composition and the mandate of the RUC,247 historically, the Police in
Northern Ireland were almost entirely Protestant, and accordingly,
influenced by the same sectarian pressures affecting civilians.2 8
Moreover, popular anti-Catholic undercurrents influenced reserve and
paramilitary branches within the official Police force, known as the
Special Constabulary. 29 This history of biased enforcement of Northern
Ireland's laws created a feeling of vulnerability and mistrust of the
Police within the Catholic Community. This mistrust has proven
difficult to alter, and continues to affect the Parade issue today. 250
In the summer of 1920, as both sides positioned themselves for
partition, Protestants attacked Catholics indiscriminately, "burning
with the Public Order Act 1951 and the Flags and Emblems Act 1954, giving itself
control over purely political opposition to the regime. Stormont further amended and
strengthened the Public Order Act as late as 1969.
245. FARRELL, supra note 234, at 93-94.
246. COOGAN, supra note 10, at 49.
247. See infra Part V.D.; see also infra note 265.
248. See infra Part V.D.
249. See infra Part V.D.
250. See infra Part VIII.
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Catholic homes, driving Catholic workers from their jobs and murdering
Catholics randomly. 25 ' Catholics retaliated and Britain was forced to
intervene.5 2  However, Britain was waging a battle against Irish
Republicans, including the IRA, throughout Ireland at the time, as were
various Protestant paramilitary groups.253 Consequently, Britain allied
itself with these illegal organizations, including the Ulster Volunteer
Force (UVF).5  This de facto alliance between Britain and Unionists
paramilitaries was officially recognized in late 1920 when Westminster
converted the illegal UVF into an official organization: the Ulster
Special Constabulary. 5  After Partition, the "Specials" became the
reserve police force in Northern Ireland. They were divided into three
branches (A, B, and C) with recruiting focused on UVF members. All
branches were entirely Protestant, highly undisciplined, and detested by
the Catholic community. Some, including the British Commander-In-
Chief in Ireland, thought them so undisciplined as to be counter-
productive.256 Arguably, their excesses were useful in intimidating the
Catholic population, though at the expense of strengthening Catholic
resentment of the new state. Consequently, Protestants were legally
armed while Catholics were not officially permitted to possess weapons.
As the most influential Unionist leader explained, "in Ulster owing to
the system of the A, B, and C Constabulary, there is no reason why
every Loyalist should not have arms to his hand, legally agreed to by the
Government.,
257
The Specials were Protestants and only responsible to the Stormont
government. That government, in turn, was controlled by the same
Unionists who "had threatened rebellion against home-rule, formed the
UVF, and condoned highly sectarian acts including murder, against the
Catholic community. 258 With the arguably unwitting assistance of the
251. MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 60. For an excellent discussion of these
events, including the large-scale rioting, see COLM Fox, THE MAKING OF A MINORITY:
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN DERRY AND THE NORTH 1912-25 (1997) (excerpt available
at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelemi/fox.htm>).
252. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 60.
253. See id. at 60-61.
254. See id. The UVF was essentially a Protestant paramilitary/vigilante group that
acted as the unofficial enforcers of Protestant supremacy. The Army and the UVF even
patrolled together. See id. at 61.
255. See id.
256. See FARRELL, supra note 234, at 35-36.
257. MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 61 (quoting Lord Craigavon, also known as
James Craig, was Northern Ireland's first Prime Minister).
258. Id.
British army, the Protestant alliance between militias and the official
government beat the Catholic population into submission. Out of a
Catholic population of 93,000, in Belfast alone, 250 had been killed,
11,000 driven from their jobs, and 22,000 forced from their homes.259
The new Catholic minority in the Northern Ireland State found itself
unprotected, terrorized, and eventually denied exercise of any
meaningful political power.2"
After devolution of power to Stormont, the Northern government
continued to strengthen its Police forces. On April 4, 1922, Stormont
disbanded the RIC"' and the new 3,000 member RUC was formed. It
composed of 1,000 A Specials and 2,000 ex-RIC men.262 It was
contemplated that one-third of the RUC would be made of Catholic ex-
RIC members; however, less than half the proposed number of Catholics
came forward.26' Therefore, the balance was made up by recruiting more
Specials. The new Northern Ireland State, aided by Catholic disloyalty
and mistrust, had effectively co-opted the Loyalist paramilitary
movement into its police force with two related results. First, Protestant
sectarianism influenced and tainted the institution, and, consequentially,
Catholics were less likely to join up. During the RUC's history, the
Catholic proportion never significantly increased and an independent
commission found that in 1969 only about 11% of the force was
Catholic. 264 The religious make-up of the RUC was most recently
addressed by a commission chaired by the former Governor of Hong
Kong, Chris Patten. The report recommended that the force, 92% of
which is Protestant, should be reduced, with recruitment focused on
Catholics for the next 10 years.265
The RUC also acted as a quasi-military force. Unlike their colleagues
in Britain, they were always armed, trained, and supplied with rifles,
machine guns, and armored cars.2 6 As Farrell notes, from the 1950's
onward "the RUC included a special Commando reserve force whose
functions were almost entirely paramilitary. 267
In August 1922, the Minister of Home Affairs,2 68 Dawson Bates,
259. See id.
260. See id. See also infra Part V.E.
261. RIC refers to the Royal Irish Constabulary, the RUC predecessor.
262. See FARRELL, supra note 234, at 54.
263. See id. at 96. As Farrell notes, "In 1922, Catholics were unlikely to join a
force so much identified with the new state." Id.
264. See id.
265. See THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND, 1999 (the full Report is available at <http://www.belfast.org.uk/
report.htm>).
266. See FARRELL, supra note 234, at 96.
267. Id.
268. The Minister of Home Affairs is in charge of the police.
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clarified the connection between the RUC and Orangeism by permitting
the formation of a special RUC Orange Lodge. 269  Although public
participation in politics was later discouraged, many RUC men remained
active members in the Orange Order.2 0  The RUC could hardly be
impartial when the Orange Order or Unionist party was concerned, as
membership was for the most part interchangeable.
The tone of the Special Constabulary was even worse. Upon the
formation of the Specials, the Ulster Unionist Council passed a
resolution "strongly recommending all Loyalists to join and give the
new force their support in every way possible., 27' This policy for the
creation of an entirely Protestant private army was expounded upon by
at least two notable figures. Sir Henry Wilson noted that, "[t]he Specials
are now all Protestants," while Prime Minister James Craig said that,
"[i]t is also from the ranks of the Loyal Orange Institution that our
splendid Specials have come." 272
The nearly exclusive Protestant membership of the RUC and the
Specials combined with the use and enforcement of the draconian
Special Powers Act, led Catholics to perceive the RUC as nothing more
than the militarized arm of the Unionist party. 273 As will be discussed,
this perception remains.
269. See FARRELL, supra note 234, at 96.
270. See id.
271. Id. at 95.
272. Id. Farrell notes that the Manchester Guardian, May 19, 1921, describes the
Specials role in the Troubles,
The unionists have an important ally ... they have a coercive police force of
their own ..... They (the Specials) have become what everybody who knows
Ulster perceived they would become-the instruments of a religious tyranny..
• . Some of them, the Class A, become regular RUC, the rest, the B and C
classes parade their districts at night with arms, harassing, threatening, beating,
and occasionally killing their Catholic neighbors and burning their homes.
Id. Farrell also notes that, "The A and C Specials were disbanded when the boundary
question was settled at the end of 1925, but the B Specials were kept on with an average
membership of between 11,000 and 12,000. They were eventually disbanded only in
October 1969. They retained their peculiar characteristics throughout." Id. William
Grant MP said at Stormont in 1936 that, "I would like to point out the Special
Constabulary are composed entirely of loyal Protestant working men.... There are no
Roman Catholics among the Special Constabulary." Id. In 1969, the Hunt Committee
on the Reorganization of the Police in Northern Ireland commented that, "while there is
no law or official rule that precludes any person, whatever his religion, from joining the
Ulster Special Constabulary ("USC") the fact remains that, for whatever reasons, no
Roman Catholic is a member." Id. They recommended the disbanding of the USC. See
id.
273. See id. at 97.
E. The Stonnont Era
After the initial tumult of Partition, Catholics slowly realized that they
274could not overturn Protestant supremacy. Protests, whether
parliamentary or extra-parliamentary, only backfired, intensifying the
Protestant solidarity that fostered their grievances in the first place.
Thereafter, a tradition of abstentionist politics evolved within the
276Nationalist community. With many Catholics believing themselves
doomed to permanent political impotence, Protestants ruled unimpeded
so long as they maintained unity under the auspices of the Unionist
Party. From 1921 to 1968, Unionists remained united, turning Northern
Ireland into an effective single-party system. Meanwhile, Britain,
relieved of the difficult task of "governing" Ireland, turned a blind eye to
the behavior of the Stormont government.
From its foundation until its suspension in 1972, Stormont was
governed exclusively by Unionists. 277 Moreover, the government and the
Unionist party were entirely Protestant, and almost all Unionist
Members of Parliament and nearly all ministers were members of the
Orange Order who paraded and regularly spoke at Orange Parades. 278
Thus, the Unionist Party was "shamelessly sectarian." '279 The definitive
statement of Unionist policy came from the Minister of Agriculture, Sir
Basil Brooke. Speaking in March 1934:
I recommend those people who are Loyalists not to employ Roman Catholics,
99 percent of whom are disloyal. I want you to remember one point in regard to
the employment of people who are disloyal.... You are disenfranchising
yourselves in that way . .. . You people who are employers have the ball at
your feet. If you don't act properly now, before we know where we are we shall
find ourselves in the minority instead of the majority. I want you to realize that,
having done your bit, you have got the Prime Minister behind you. 280
274. See infra Part V.H.
275. Nationalist protests against the government could not escape the perception
that they simply wanted out of Great Britain, and they did not appear to try to change this
perception, which further cemented Unionist fears of the "traitor within." See infra Part
V.H.
276. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 507, 510.
277. See FARRELL, supra note 234, at 62. "Every government was Unionist; every
member of every government was a Unionist of one stripe or another; and every
parliament had a unionist majority, with 32 out of 52 seats the low-water mark for the
Unionist Party." Id. at 62.
278. See id. at 62-63, 65.
279. MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 62-63. The comments of Northern Ireland's
first Prime Minister illustrate the point. Lord Craigavon, Prime Minister from 1921-40,
summed up the ethos of the state in 1934 when he stated: "I have always said that I am
an Orangeman first and a politician and a member of this Parliament afterwards. ...
All I boast is that we have a Protestant parliament and a Protestant State." Id.
280. FARRELL, supra note 234, at 90-91.
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Terence O'Neill, Prime Minister from 1963-69, explained at the end
of his career that "[ilf you treat Roman Catholics with due consideration
and kindness, they will live like Protestants." '' This statement, though
insulting, was in fact indicative of a liberalization of Unionist orthodoxy;
previous Unionist governments had preferred that Catholic culture
remain segregated and in a state of dissention. "Better that Catholics
sustain their traditional disloyalty, and thus justify Unionist
Sectarianism 282 had been the prevailing sentiment.
The Nationalist Party is the perfect opposite of the Unionist Party, as it
is, "Catholic rather than Protestant, anti-partitionist rather than
partitionist, and powerless rather than powerful. 28 3 For example, no
Nationalist ever held a cabinet post during Stormont's existence and
only one Nationalist bill concerning wild birds ever past into law . The
Nationalist party's primary focus, as its name implies, precludes it from
garnering majority support in the Province. Its weakness stemmed from
an obvious contradiction; advocation of the unification of Ireland
through electoral means was destined to fail, considering that two-thirds
of Northern Ireland' s electorate strongly opposed unification.285
The Nationalist Party's politics changed very little from Partition to
the late 1960's. It was, staunchly, but peacefully opposed to partition,
instead favoring a 32-county Republic of Ireland. For the most part, the
Nationalist party represented the aspirations of the city-dwelling
Catholic middle class. Anxious to develop a Catholic ascendancy and
fearful that Protestant professionals (such as doctors and lawyers) might
offer advice inconsistent with Catholic beliefs (e.g. abortion, divorce),
the Church put its full support behind the Catholic middle class and thus
the Nationalist party.286 In fact, there is evidence of Catholics believing
that it was a sin to vote against the Nationalist Party.287 It is clear that the
party was closely associated with the church. For example, the local
parish and not the electoral district acted as the basic unit of the party's
organization and the parish priest would generally chair the caucus to
select a candidate.288 This is, of course, consistent with the Protestant
281. MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 63.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 67.
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 68.
287. See id. at 69.
288. See id.
fear of a theocracy and is an example of the blurry line between religion
and politics in Northern Ireland. The Catholic Church had always been
a central political and social force in Ireland. With the rise of the Irish
Free State, and the consequent guerrilla-style civil war that followed, the
stirrings of militant Catholic Nationalism just beyond the border
arguably prompted Ulster Protestants to maintain a constant defensive
posture.
When the Unionist Party proclaimed each election to be a referendum
on partition, rather than on social issues, the Nationalist Party agreed and
rallied Catholic support of dissolving the border. However, the Party's
position on partition and the involvement of the Catholic Church in the
party machinery only bolstered Protestant support for the Unionist Party.
The ease with which it won elections encouraged the Unionist Party to
stick to the proven electoral platform of preserving the cultural and
economic union with Britain. With elections focusing on the
constitutional status of Northern Ireland, a vote against Unionism was
deemed tantamount to a vote for inclusion of the six counties into the
"papist state" to the south.
The tactics of some southern Nationalist politicians assisted this
manipulation of the Protestant electorate immeasurably. Periodically the
dominant southern party (Fianna Fail) initiated campaigns to abolish the
border separating north from south."9 Although rarely amounting to
anything more than propaganda for an inattentive international audience,
they nonetheless lent credibility to the Republican specter which tied the
Protestant working class to Unionism.
Simultaneously buoyed by and beholden to the support of the
Protestant working class, Unionists wielded political power in a manner
that overtly discriminated against the Catholic population. Northern
Ireland's Catholic minority was deprived of political power through
gerrymandering2'9 and economic power through discrimination in state
housing and jobs.29' The Special Powers Act 1922,292 and later the Public
289. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 542, 677.
290. The Unionist Party used its supremacy to control local governments, even in
areas of Catholic majorities, by limiting the franchise to heads of households, thus
eliminating poorer tenants and lodgers, predominately Catholic, from the rolls.
Furthermore, the government allowed owners of business property (invariably
Protestants) plural votes, up to a maximum of six. Unionists were able to use these
artificial majorities to appoint Protestants to nearly all high level public offices.
Unionists also protected their majority's grip by gerrymandering local electoral districts.
As a result, many Catholic areas were governed by Unionists despite the demographics.
See Myers, supra note 166, at 19-22. But see WHYTE, supra note 41. Whyte argues that
discrimination was not as widespread and institutionalized as some scholars suggest. He
agrees that gerrymandering kept Catholics out of power at the local level, but did not
have the same affect with regards to the national or provincial elections. Id.
291. See supra note 234. But see WHYTE, supra note 41, for other factors that
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Order Act 1936,293 prevented extraparliamentary agitation for redress. In
1966, the British National Commission on Civil Liberties ("NCCL")
commented that the Unionists had created, "under the shadow of the
British constitution a permanent machine of dictatorship. ' 29 As Farrell
notes, the NCCL equated Northern Ireland with recent fascist
dictatorships in Europe. Farrell argues that, "[i]n so far as the unity of
party and state was one of the hallmarks of European fascism, the
comparison was apt. 295
From this history developed the structure of sectarian relationships in
the new state of Northern Ireland. A long history of Protestant colonial
occupation of a predominately Catholic Ireland, either provoked or
sustained by the credible threat of Irish disloyalty and Catholic
treachery, cast a dark shadow over "community relations." Within this
system grew two distinct cultures and traditions that were diametrically
opposed to each other. Eventually the instability of British colonialism
required a transition from colonial rule to a more democratic system, but
rather than devolving power to the whole island, Britain split Ireland in
two to prevent civil war between the Unionists in the North and the
burgeoning Irish Nationalist movement in the South. As a result,
Unionists found themselves in a peculiar position. They were now the
majority of a democratic system of government. Home Rule meant they
were no longer constrained by British pluralist politics, and they now
faced the threat of Catholic disloyalty from both within the new state
and from just across the border to the south. But to maintain a
cohesiveness, and thus political power, Unionism had to bridge the
socio-economic gap between the staunchly conservative philosophy of
the party elites and the Protestant working class. They accomplished
this by maintaining and confirming the history of sectarian conflict.
As a result, the Orange Order, the government, and the RUC became
closely connected. Laws passed by the Unionist-controlled government
had the desired affect of rendering the Catholic minority politically and
socially powerless. The Orange Order maintained Protestant working
class support of the government, in exchange for a system that favored
Protestants over Catholics. And the RUC, susceptible to anti-Catholic
affect disparate employment and housing figures among Protestants and Catholics.
292. See supra Part V.B.
293. Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8, 1 Geo. 6, ch. 6 (Eng.).
294. FARRELL, supra note 234, at 97. The NCCL refers to the British National
Commission on Civil Liberties.
295. Id.
sentiment, made sure Catholics accepted the arrangement. Northern
Ireland's Catholics soon felt the historical grip of Unionism grow
tighter. Perhaps this is most evident by the manner in which parades
were regulated during the Stormont era.
F. Policing Processions: The Orange Order's Internal Influence
The Orange influence on the RUC is apparent in its role of regulating
parades and demonstrations. In the late 1940's, Northern Nationalist
efforts to organize parades and demonstrations were met with
government restrictions and bans. In March 1948, the Minister of Home
Affairs banned an Anti-Partition League St. Patrick's Day parade in
Derry where marchers had planned to carry the flag of the Irish
Republic, the acknowledged symbol of the Nationalist/Republican
296movement. Local Loyalists threatened a massive counter-
demonstration and consequently, the parade was banned under the
Special Powers Act.2 9' In banning the Parade, the minister in charge
stated that, "[s]o long as this government lasts and so long as I am
minister of Home Affairs, I shall not permit the Republican flag to be
carried through Derry City... No Surrender., 298 A local Orange leader
and activist, commented that, "The minister was perfectly right in
suppressing that demonstration for if he had not done so we [The Derry
Unionists] would."2 99 The government's cooperation with the demands
of the Local Loyalists fostered deep resentment among the Derry
Catholic majority, which was made worse by the fact that the
government allowed the Loyalist Apprentice Boys to march the walls of
Derry every year.300
After the Westminster election in February 1950, Nationalists, bouyed
by a victory, marched through the streets of Enniskillen carrying the
Irish tricolor.'O The RUC charged the crowd, and after fierce fighting,
seized the tricolor. Later in March, the government banned a St.
Patrick's day parade from Monymore in County Derry." 2  In
Aughnocloy in County Tyrone, the RUC charged a Nationalist parade
and seized the Irish flag.30 3 In August, a Loyalist crowd attacked and
stoned a procession of cars, buses, and a band going through
Cookstown, County Tyrone, to a Gaelic football match in Magherafelt
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while the RUC stood by and refused to stop the excesses of the crowd.3"
In July 1951, Stormont quickly drafted a Public Order bill requiring
48 hours notice of all non-traditional 35 parades, and giving the
government or the RUC power to ban or re-route parades if the
authorities believed that parades might lead to a breach of the peace.3°6
Again, there was no appeal permitted from a ban or a re-routing order.
Despite the opposition's denouncement of the bill, it was quickly passed
by parliament. 3°7
Before the bill was passed into law, the RUC attacked an AOH3 °s
parade, beating male and female paraders and seizing the Irish tricolor.3°9
Later, the RUC cut down tricolors from several private houses in town.
Farrell argues that, "the government was responding to pressure from
local Loyalists."31  The Unionist MP for Enniskillen, remarked that,
"[h]ad the Minister for Home Affairs refused to forbid the tricolor being
carried through Enniskillen then we would have taken steps to see it
wasn't carried.""' To punctuate this statement, three hundred club-
carrying Loyalists prevented a local Catholic band from ? arading
through the village of Tempo near Enniskillen a few days later.
The Flags and Emblems Act 1954 gave the RUC a considerable
amount of discretion, and it tended to use this discretion inconsistently.3 3
The discretionary application of the law took on a sectarian flavor.3 '4 For
the most part, though, the RUC had given up banning the Irish flag in
304. See id.
305. This meant that annual Orange parades were excluded from the provisions of
the bill.
306. Public Order Act, 1951, 14 & 19 Geo. 6, ch. 19 (Eng.). See FARRELL, supra
note 234, at 200.
307. See FARRELL, supra note 234, at 200.
308. Ancient Order of Hibernians, a Gaelic and quasi-Nationalist organization.




313. See Flags and Emblems (Display) Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, ch. 10 (Eng.). The
RUC banned the use of the tricolor in parades in the Falls Road area of Belfast in 1963,
and in Easter Rising commemoration parades in Newry and Armagh in 1964. However,
the tricolor was allowed to be carried in similar parades in Belfast in 1965. See BOB
PURDIE, POLITICS IN THE STREET, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN
NORTHERN IRELAND 30-31 (1990).
314. See PURDIE, supra note 313, at 30-31. In 1965, an Orange procession was
allowed to pass through Nationalist areas in Co. Antrim. The Chief Inspector, in reply to
questions about the decision not to tone down the parade said that, "[the police] would
never interfere with people who were carrying the 'flag of this country."' Id. at 31.
Nationalist areas, unless Loyalists forced their hands. In 1965, Sinn
Fdin placed a tricolor in the window of its election headquarters on Divis
Street, located in the middle of the Falls road, the most famous of the
Catholic Nationalist areas of Belfast. The Reverend Ian Paisley
announced that if the RUC did not remove the flag then he and his
supporters would march into the Falls and remove it himself.35 Without
doubt, if this had actually happened the city would have erupted in
violence. The day after, the Minister of Home Affairs pleaded with
Paisley to call off the March while the RUC chief inspector in the
company of 50 officers broke into the headquarters and took down the
flag. ' 6 Not surprisingly, for the next three days, intense rioting racked
the Nationalist areas of Belfast.37
Even when the RUC acted against Loyalist interests, they could not
win. On the rare occasions when the government acted against Loyalist
parades and demonstrations, such action had little effect. In 1935, after
a Loyalist festival spawned fierce rioting, then Minister of Home
Affairs, Dawson Bates issued a ban on all parades including the
traditional Orange Parades marking July 12.3 On June 23, Orangemen
marched through the streets of Belfast in defiance of the parade ban and
the RUC took no action.3 9 On the same day, the Orange Grand Master,
said:
You may be perfectly certain that on the 12 July the Orangemen will be
marching throughout Northern Ireland ... I do not acknowledge the right of any
government, Northern or imperial, to impose conditions as to the celebration. 320
Locked in conflict with its primary supporters, Bates caved in and
lifted the ban.32 The Glorious 12th parades went ahead as planned, and
regular attacks and shootings in Catholic areas soon followed.322
In June 1966, Paisley supporters, after parading through the Catholic
Cormac Square, resulting in a riot, proceeded to attack the Governor of
Northern Ireland.323 Paisley was prosecuted and sent to jail for three
months, and his supporters reacted quickly and violently, fighting with
the RUC outside the prison, and rampaging through downtown
Belfast.12 In response, the government issued a 3-month ban on all
315. See FARRELL, supra note 234, at 233.
316. See id.
317. See id. at 234. Three hundred and fifty RUC officers in riot gear stormed the
Falls Road, causing nearly fifty residents to require hospitalization. See id.





323. See id. at 235.
324. See id.
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meetings and parades in Belfast and authorized the RUC to break up
gatherings of three or more people.325
Though the native Irish Catholics have historically made poor British
subjects, the reliance of Unionism on the constitutional issue, the Orange
Order, and sectarianism during the Stormont era cemented modern
Catholic disloyalty. Strangely enough, Catholic acknowledgment of
their British citizenship ignited the "Troubles" of the last 30 years.
Rather than embracing a traditional Nationalist-abstentionist role in
politics, a movement started among Catholics premised on the idea that
as members of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland's Catholics were
entitled the same civil rights afforded to all of Britain's subjects.326
Inspired by the civil rights movement currently then under way in the
American South, the civil rights groups, including the Northern Ireland
Civil Rights Association ("NICRA"), assembled in the mid 1960s in
order to redress the government with their grievances.327
G. Police Powers and the Civil Rights Movement
Terence O'Neill entered office as Northern Ireland's Prime Minister
during a period of economic decline and an increasing rate of
unemployment. O'Neill wanted to protect Protestant jobs to insure the
Orange Order's continued political support of the Unionist Party. For
this reason, O'Neill, with the aid of his chief rival within the Unionist
Party, Brian Faulkner, attempted to lure foreign investors to Northern
Ireland for the benefit of the Protestant working class. They did this by
building factories and other forms of infrastructure in heavily Protestant
populated areas, thereby insuring that new jobs would be created for the
local Protestant population."2
However, foreign investment presented problems to the Unionist Party
because Northern Ireland was generally perceived internationally as
backward. O'Neill realized that sectarianism was not conducive to
foreign investment, but he could not include Catholics in the political
system without triggering a dangerous backlash.329 To quell sectarian
tensions, O'Neill embarked on a campaign of outreach to the Catholic
325. See id.
326. See PURDIE, supra note 313, at 1-3.
327. See id. at 2-4.
328. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 623-27.
329. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 72-73.
community offering symbolic,33 rather than substantive reform, by
making pacifying overtures to Catholics without raising the ire of the
Protestant population.'
The steady loss of Protestant jobs in Northern Ireland's traditional
industries and O'Neill's gestures to the Catholic community struck a
nerve in the newly underemployed Protestant working class. The result
was the birth of the Ultra-Loyalists, led by the Reverend Ian Paisley.332
Denouncing O'Neill's softness towards Catholics, Paisley blamed
worsening conditions to Unionists on the thawing of Unionist-Catholic
relations.333 Paisley warned of a Catholic conspiracy to rid Ireland of
Protestants and continued his provocative antics, which included
throwing snowballs at the Republic's Prime Minister after a meeting
with O'Neill and publicly demonstrating against Protestants involved in
ecumenicalism."'
Meanwhile, Catholics, their expectations raised by O'Neill's gestures,
began to demand more substance and less symbolism. They pointed out
that the Catholic unemployment rate remained disproportionately high
and that Catholic political power was non-existent.3  The impossibility
of satisfying mutual grievances demonstrated the zero-sum dilemma of
politics in Northern Ireland. Protestants believed Catholic ascendancy
would lead directly and proportionally to their economic decline.
Catholics blamed generations of Protestant hegemony for their political
and economic suffering; therefore, any privilege conferred upon the
Protestant community, whether purposeful or not, was deemed just one
more example of the evils of colonialism. The kindling for the
"troubles" was stacked awaiting just a single spark.
The Catholic Civil Rights movement provided that spark by exercising
a quintessential English civil liberty-the exercise of free assembly. In
the mid- 1960's, many Catholics, realizing that partition was
unassailable, rejected both nationalism and Republicanism in favor of a
popular struggle for civil rights. Essentially, the movement argued that
it was better to accept partition and to make the best of a bad situation
than to protest against a border that would not be changed no matter how
indignant their complaints.36 The civil rights protesters contended that if
Northern Ireland was to belong to the United Kingdom, then they were
330. See id. O'Neill made a point to visit Catholic schools and hospitals, and to




334. See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 397. See also MACDONALD, supra note 28, at
73.
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336. See PURDIE, supra note 313, at 2.
[VOL. 1: 175, 2000] Orange Order
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
entitled to their rights as British citizens.337 This departure from the
habitual Catholic rejection may, as Unionists claim, have been only a
ruse to disarm them of their traditional justification for the exclusion of
Catholics from political power, but it succeeded anyway. Instead of
reinforcing Protestant solidarity (as protests against partition had done),
the civil rights movement exploited the divisions in the Unionist Party
that had surfaced in the early 1960s. It trapped reformists, like O'Neill,
into backing their earlier gestures with substantive reforms, while
confirming the more traditional Unionist majority that one concession
merely fueled demands for more.38 In discrediting the justification for
Protestant domination, Catholics also shattered the formerly monolithic
unity of the Unionist party. In one year, the civil rights movement
destroyed Unionist unity, shook the Catholic community from 50 years
of quiescence, and forced Britain to commit its regular army to Northern
Ireland.
In essence, the civil rights movement was protesting against official
discrimination at the local level, and against repressive legislation at the
provincial level.339  Yet no matter how innocuous the civil rights
demands were in themselves, they seemed subversive to the political
power structure of Northern Ireland. 340  By demanding the rights of
British citizens, rather than claiming allegiance to the Irish Republic,
civil rights demonstrators discredited Protestant supremacy. By
implicitly accepting the Britishness of Northern Ireland, Catholics shed
the label of "treachery" that Unionists had offered as the reasons for
their oppressive policies towards the Catholic community. Thereafter,
337. See id.
338. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 77-78.
339. The movement pressed for the following rights:
1) universal franchise in local government elections in line with the franchise
in the rest of the United Kingdom;
2) the redrawing of electoral boundaries by an independent commission in
ensure fair representation;
3) legislation against discrimination in employment at the local government
level and the provision of machinery to remedy local government grievances;
4) a compulsory points system for housing which would ensure fair allocation;
5) the repeal of the Special Powers Act;
6) the disbanding of the B-Specials, and the disarming of the RUC;
7) and later the withdrawal of the Public Order Bill.
COOGAN, supra note 10, at 67.
340. See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 67. "The NICRA (Northern Ireland Civil
Rights Association) shopping list was like a red flag to a bull in the eyes of Unionist
fundamentalists, constituting a root-and-branch attack on the whole idea of a Unionist
state." Id.
Unionists slowly divided between those willing and those refusing to
entertain Catholic grievances. "'
Catholic civil rights demonstrations were met with Protestant counter-
demonstrations. Citing the threat of violence from hecklers that these
demonstrations created, O'Neill's rivals banned the original protests.3' 2
The police were dispatched to clear the roads of defiant protestors,
which resulted in riots.3 43 The civil disorder and subsequent excessive
force of the police, compelled Britain to pressure O'Neill for reforms in
employment, the allocation of housing, and political districting.'
44
NICRA planned a civil rights march for October 5, 1968, through the
streets of Derry.345  The proposed route took the marchers from the
Catholic area of the Waterside, across Craigavon Bridge, and into the
city center. The inner walls of Derry, sacred to the Apprentice Boys,
had not been breached by Catholic protesters since the RUC beat the
Anti-Partition league off the road in the early 1950s. 34 Unionists were
furious. Four days before the scheduled march, the Apprentice Boys
gave notice of an "annual march" planned for the same route, though no
one had ever heard of the "annual" parade.3 47  Nonetheless, the
government banned all parades, except in the Catholic ghetto of the
Waterside, and Craig raised a massive police force including reserves
348and water cannons.
In defiance of the ban, the marchers set off from the Waterside but
found themselves trapped in the narrow streets by two lines of police.
The police proceeded to beat the protesters savagely, and chased random
groups of demonstrators into the Catholic Bogside. Fighting broke out
throughout the night as barricades were set up in the ghetto, and
Molotov cocktails were launched from within.349
On January 1, 1969, NICRA began another march from Belfast to
Derry, patterned after the Selma-Montgomery march in Alabama in
341. See PURDIE, supra note 313, at 32-35.
342. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 77. See also BARDON, supra note 31, at
653-55 (discussing the events surrounding Derry Civil Rights march of October 5,
1968); id. at 655-59 (discussing the events between October and December); id. at 659-
61 (discussing the ambush at Burntollet in January, 1969); id. at 666-69 (discussing the
Battle of the Bogside).
343. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 77.
344. See PURDIE, supra note 313, at 69-71. See also BARDON, supra note 31, at
657; COOGAN, supra note 10, at 82.
345. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 653.
346. See FARRELL, supra note 234, at 246.
347. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 653. See also FARRELL, supra note 234, at 246.
348. See FARRELL, supra note 234, at 246. See also PURDIE, supra note 313, at 139-
41.
349. See FARRELL, supra note 234, at 246-47.
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1966.350 When the march reached Antrim, a handful of Paisleyites began
to gather. The RUC immediately stopped the march as the Paisleyites
summoned more Loyalists counter demonstrators."' The stalemate
lasted until the next morning. As the march proceeded over the next
several days, the RUC halted the marchers on several occasions claiming
that hostile crowds were ahead, when in fact, crowds of Loyalists were
gathering on the alternative routes the RUC had proposed.352 On January
4, the RUC again stopped the march and warned of "stone throwers"
ahead, then suddenly the RUC allowed the marchers to proceed.353 As
the march approached an underpass, dozens of Loyalist hurled rocks and
bottles, then charged with clubs and iron bars, beating the marchers off
the road and severely injuring several.354
The RUC apparently knew an ambush had been set. Stones were piled
the night before and crowds of club-wielding men had gathered early
while members of the RUC were seen laughing and chatting amongst
them.35 During the ambush, some even joined in. After the attack, no
arrests were made.356
In November 1968, O'Neill offered a package of reforms that resolved
several, but not all of the grievances of the civil rights movement.357 In
appeasing Britain, however, O'Neill had only antagonized Protestants




350. See PURDIE, supra note 313, at 213.
351. Seeid. at 213-14.
352. See id. at 214. See also BARDON, supra note 31, at 659-61.
353. See PURDIE, supra note 313, at 214. See also BARDON, supra note 31, at 659-
61.
354. See PURDIE, supra note 313, at 214. See also BARDON, supra note 31, at 659-
61.
355. See PURDIE, supra note 313. See also BARDON, supra note 31, at 659-61;
FARRELL, supra note 234, at 250-51.
356. See FARRELL, supra note 234, at 250-51. The march eventually made it to
Derry, beaten and bruised, but was stopped once more on the outskirts of town where
marchers were pelted with rocks and bottles. That night, members of the RUC reserve
force, apparently furious that the march had actually reached the town, rampaged
through the Catholic Bogside, breaking windows and beating up pedestrians. The
residents were outraged and Free Derry was born. Free Derry designates a "No Go"
area, where the authority of the police was not recognized. Barricades went up and the
RUC was kept out of the Bogside for a week. See id.
357. See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 76. O'Neill's reform package contained five
points: the abolition of the Derry Corporation; the appointment of an ombudsman; a new
system of housing allocation; a promise that the Special Powers Act would be abolished
when it was safe to do so; and an end to the company vote. See id.
358. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 77. "Civil rights militants only pointed out
that the reforms were merely proposed, not implemented; that no commitment to the
Amid Unionist losses in the February 1969 election and a splintering
party, which amounted to a referendum on his proposals, O'Neill
resigned. 9 A Unionist moderate, James Chichester-Clark assumed the
Premiereship, and conceded to ultra-Loyalist demands.3 60 Britain went
along with Chichester-Clark in the fear that without British support, he
might be replaced by a more radical Unionist.3 61 With Britain's reluctant
consent, Chichester-Clark was able to push Ultra-Loyalist demands from
a fairly moderate position. Specifically, he persuaded Westminster to
allow contentious Orange parades during the socially and politically
explosive months of July and August, 1969. Catholic Civil rights
marches were met with violent Protestant resistance, the Orange parades
were more triumphal and taunting than usual, Catholics obliged
Protestant provocation by overreacting, and the resulting riots were more
ferocious than usual.362  When Stormont civil authority and control
vanished, the British government sent in the army to quell the sectarian
strife.
363
The official reaction to the protest marches and demonstrations and
the ferocity of violence that swarmed around them were, perhaps, the
most shocking aspects of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland.
The violence of the 1960s foreshadowed even worse violence in the next
three decades.3"
H. The Collapse of Stormont
As the civil rights movement degraded into chaos, nonprotesting
Catholics bore the brunt. Of the eight people killed in Belfast riots on
August 14 and 15, 1969, six were Catholics. Eighty-three percent of the
homes damaged or destroyed during the riots were Catholic, as Catholic
neighborhoods had no protection from Protestant and police
161campaigns.
For the first time since Partition, the British army was deployed to
keep the peace in Northern Ireland. Initially Catholics welcomed the
principle 'one man, one vote' had been offered; that the Special Powers Act remained
intact; and that the larger problem of unemployment was not even broached." Id.
359. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 661-64. See also MACDONALD, supra note 28,
at 79.
360. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 665, 672-73. See also MACDONALD, supra
note 28, at 79.
361. See MACDONALD, supra note 28, at 79.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. After British troops were called in to maintain public order, the IRA re-
emerged and began its now infamous guerrilla campaign prompting Loyalist paramilitary
groups to follow suit. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 675-85.
365. See Myers, supra note 166, at 24.
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British Army to protect their neighborhoods from roving Protestant
gangs.366 But, the Army's welcome soon wore out. Within a year, the
British army's reactionary tactics led to repeated confrontations with
mobs in Catholic areas of Derry and Belfast and to the deaths of
Catholic protesters.367 These tactics drove, "the most moderate Catholics
to press for communal self-protection. 3 6  The IRA was reborn as the
defenders of Catholic neighborhoods, and it soon gained broad support
in the Catholic community.369
The Prime Minister and the British Home Secretary instituted a policy
of confrontation with the Catholic community by declaring war on the
IRA, and pursuing a system of official crackdown on Catholic ghettos.
The Army and the RUC engaged in broad "security sweeps" of Catholic
ghettos, rounding up men and boys on the thinnest suspicion of IRA
involvement.370 Matters only became worse when on August 9, 1971,
British Prime Minister Heath and the new Northern Irish Prime Minister
Brian Faulkner initiated internment, without charges or trial, of any
suspected terrorists or terrorist sympathizers.3 7' Thereafter the IRA
appeared to assume an offensive and indiscriminately bloody posture.
Internment372 provoked the IRA into a full-scale bombing campaign.
More than 100 explosions ripped through Belfast in August 1971 and
thirty-five people were killed. Catholics of all political persuasions
366. See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 123. The IRA had not been a factor, other than
a motivator for Loyalist vigilantism, since the 1950's. Catholics, feeling abandoned by
the IRA, openly welcomed the British troops as guarantors against further Protestant and
police attacks. During this period, murals and graffiti in Catholic areas of Belfast bore
the slogan: "IRA: I Ran Away." See id.
367. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 672-78. See also Myers, supra note 166, at 25-
26.
368. Myers, supra note 166, at 25.
369. See id. at 25-26.
370. See Myers, supra note 166, at 26-29. Two thousand, one hundred and fifty
eight people, mostly Catholic males, were interned during the ensuing four years. A
majority of detainees were held without charges for more than a year and hundreds of
cases of physical abuse at the hands of the RUC and the British Army were reported. In
1976, Ireland brought Britain before the European Commission of Human Rights
claiming that Britain violated the European Convention on Human Rights by committing
or condoning acts of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment of Republican
prisoners. The European Court of Human Rights affirmed the Commission's findings as
to inhuman and degrading treatment. Subsequently, the British government admitted to
authorizing techniques of physical and psychological torture in the interrogation of
prisoners. See id.
371. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 681-84.
372. Internment refers to the system of arrest and confinement without trial for
suspected offenses under the Special Powers Act. See id.
came together in opposition to Stormont. "Moderate Catholics joined
huge Republican protests, held despite an official ban, and the Catholic
opposition to the Protestant government and its British overseers
crystallized in a massive civil disobedience campaign, including tax and
rent strikes that lasted more than three years."373
On January 30, 1972, Catholic protesters staged a massive anti-
internment demonstration in the City of Londonderry, the symbolic
birthplace of the Protestant siege mentality.374 The British army opened
fire on an estimated 20,000 unarmed marchers, killing thirteen, seven of
these teenagers.375 Immediately after "Bloody Sunday," Catholics rioted
throughout Ireland, both north and south of the border.376 The IRA
began a new, more violent campaign. By March 20, the IRA had killed
56 British soldiers and four days later the British Prime Minister ordered
the Stormont government suspended, reimposing direct rule of Northern
Ireland from London.377
VI. THE RISE OF DISENCHANTED LOYALISM
While Nationalists had traditionally suffered the indignities of second-
class citizenship at the hands of a Unionist-dominated government,
Loyalists were not completely free from such indignities, nor were the
majority of Loyalists economically better off. As one commentator
points out:
The Loyalist story of the conflict in Northern Ireland is not one of domination,
but one of poverty, disenfranchisement, and marginalization. It is the story of
the Protestant working-class community, which has been on the front-line of the
conflict by virtue of sharing the poorer neighborhoods of Belfast, Lisburn and
Portadown as well as rural mid-Ulster with the Catholic working class.378
Moreover, Loyalists and Nationalists are equal targets of
indiscriminate terrorist violence. As the leader of the Loyalist fringe
Ulster Democratic Party, Gary McMichael argues, in areas along the
border, the IRA has been involved in a campaign of ethnic cleansing,
killing the male family members in small Protestant communities, in
attempts to force the Protestants out of the area.379 Arguably in response
to the IRA's bloody campaigns, many Loyalist themselves lent their
support to paramilitary organizations as a method of empowering a
373. Meyers, supra note 166, at 29-30. The civil disobedience campaign included
tax and rent strikes that lasted for more than three years. See id.
374. See BARDON, supra note 31, at 686-88.
375. See Myers, supra note 166, at 30. See also BARDON, supra note 31, at 687-88.
376. See Myers, supra note 166, at 30.
377. See id. at 30.
378. MCMICHAEL, supra note 48, at 1.
379. See id. at 36.
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threatened and marginalized community.380  While these two
communities exchanged gunfire, in the early 1990's it was revealed that
the British government had been engaged in secret dialogue with the
IRA for years."'
Thus, Loyalism has transformed itself from a movement concerned
with the maintenance of Northern Ireland's constitutional status in the
United Kingdom, to a movement with all the hallmarks of ethnic self-
determination. In this respect, Ulster Loyalism has become
"conditional." An ironic development of Loyalist/Orange collusion with
the RUC is that any sign of softening attitude towards the Catholic
community was, and continues to be perceived as the beginning of the
end of Protestant dominance: the "selling out" of Protestant ideals. The
result of this development is the Orange alliance with the RUC, and its
alliance with the government is rendered conditional, often leading to
the Orange Order confronting the RUC rather than exercising its will
through the civil authorities.
Orangemen claim that being able to walk along traditional routes is an
essential feature of their civil rights. Any challenge to this is viewed as
symptomatic of the creeping influence of Dublin and of the threat of
compromise over the status of Northern Ireland. The range of towns and
villages in which the Orangemen parade regularly implies that these
rights are being actively maintained, and that no territory is abandoned
as an integral part of Protestant Ulster.
Protestant fears are not irrationally based. "[T]he [Catholic]
Church... [has had a] practical stranglehold on the regulation of
morality in the South," '382 though social reforms have since distanced the
State from the Church. The Republic's 1937 constitution ordained an,
"'ecclesiastical imperialism' of the Catholic Church in Ireland." '383  It
begins:
In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom all Authority flows and to
Whom as our first end all actions both of men and states must be referred. We,
the people of Eire, humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine
Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial.., do
hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.
384
380. See id. at 1.
381. See id. at 43.
382. Myers, supra note 166, at 20 (citing Sco'rr BELFRAGE, LIVING WITH WAR 290-
91(1987)).
383. Id.
384. IR. CONST. arts. 2,3 (Bunreacht na hEireann).
This statement, promulgated by its founders, confirms the Irish
Republic's allegiances in many respects to the Catholic Church in the
eyes of both Protestants and Catholics alike.385
A further cause of Loyalist anxiety has been the Republic of Ireland's
official position towards Northern Ireland. Until just recently,386 the Irish
Constitution laid claim to all of Ulster. Article 2 claimed national
jurisdiction over the whole island, while Article 3 contemplated
reintegration of the six counties of the North.
3 87
Since 1985, when the Anglo-Irish Agreement gave the Republic of
Ireland a nominal role in easing community relations in Northern
Ireland, Loyalists have felt even more threatened.38 8 Part of the concerns
of the loyal orders over the growing Nationalist protests at their parades
is that the areas where they are no longer able to walk freely will only
increase. The fight to maintain traditional routes in areas with a large
Catholic population is an attempt to deny or to ignore the demographic
and political changes that have been taking place in Northern Ireland in
the past few decades.
VII. THE STRUCTURE OF PARADE REGULATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND
AND THE INHERENT PITFALLS OF HISTORY
History demonstrates the animosity between Catholics and
Protestants, Loyalists and Nationalist. However, the zero-sum dilemma
is influenced by other factors as well. The hallmark of English judicial
restraint is the most important of all. Ultimate discretion on who is
allowed to march is left with the RUC. However, historical
manipulation of the RUC by Unionists and the Orange Order, and the
385. See id. at art. 40.3.3. Though abortion was already illegal, it became
unconstitutional by a referendum approved by 67% of the voters in March 1984. The
Irish Constitution severely restrains the availability of divorce, which until recently was
unlawful. Article 40.6.1.i permits the government to ban any expression in the interest
of morality. See id. at art. 40.6. 1. See generally, JAMES CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
IRELAND 317-21, 345-49, 493-504 (1987).
386. As part of the Good Friday Peace Accord, the Republic of Ireland repealed
articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution on Dec 3, 1999. Lifting of Claim to North Opens
New Chapter of History, SUNDAY TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999 (available at <http://www.sunday-
times.com.uk>).
387. IR. CONST. arts. 2, 3 (Bunreacht na hEireann). See BARDON, supra note 31, at
542.
388. Proof of this trend is the violent Protestant reaction to the Anglo-Irish
Agreement. Then Prime Minister Thatcher announced that the agreement ensured that,
"there will never be a united Ireland." After the Agreement was signed and the details
of the Irish Republic's involvement in Northern Ireland's affairs became clear,
Protestants attacked British officials, rioted against the RUC, and renewed attacks
against the Catholic population. As a result, Britain was compelled to send in army
reinforcements. Myers, supra note 166, at 58.
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subsequent mistrust of the Catholic community, made this arrangement
untenable.
A. Policing Processions: The Portadown Parades
The most recent example of the zero-sum approach to parades and
protests centers around a small Catholic neighborhood fronting the
Garvaghy road in Portadown. July of 1996 witnessed a resurgence of
the annual "Drumcree stand-off." On July 7, 1996, Orangemen
attempted to march down the Garvaghy Road although they had been
forbidden to do so by an order made by the Chief Constable of the RUC
under the Public Order Act 1986.389 The decision by the police led to
several days of Loyalist roadblocks and rioting.390 The object of the
blockades was to paralyze the economic life of the province, to stretch
the resources of the security forces so that presumably they would be
unable to contain the marchers at Drumcree who were being encouraged
to assemble there in large numbers."' Unionist leaders complained
bitterly about the way in which the Unionist and Loyalist community
had been treated prior to Drumcree, that Drumcree was the last stand;
and that if Loyalists did not take a stand at Drumcree then Ulster would
be lost.3 92 Loyalists were incensed and rioting broke out in Protestant
areas throughout the province. The Chief Constable deplored the action
by Orangemen and their supporters, declaring that their behavior
"constituted a threat to paralyze the state."'3 93 The disorder and road
blockades continued until July 11. During this period, the Unionist and
Orange leaders, while going through the motions of condemning
violence, continued to refer to the threat of violence and issued dire
warnings to the Government of the chaos that would ensue if the parade
at Drumcree was not allowed to pass.394
The RUC finally caved in. When the police reversed their decision,
the Nationalist community reacted in a similar way.395 The dispute
389. See SAVARIC, supra note 62.
390. See id.
391. Seeid.
392. JARMEN, supra note 30.
393. Id.
394. See id.
395. See SAVARIC, supra note 62: "All Catholic areas of Northern Ireland exploded
with rage. Riots in particular broke out in Armagh, Ballycastle, Ballymena, Bellachy,
Bushmills, Coalisland, Coleraine, Cookstown, Downpatrick, Dromore, Dungiven ..
Id.
polarized the two communities in a manner that had rarely been seen
before, even during the height of the Troubles. The political middle
ground disappeared, and a return to paramilitary violence was
anticipated. In the end, the two sides pulled back, although the protests
against the parades continued. The dispute continued to smolder with a
campaign of consumer boycotts, intimidation, sporadic arson attacks,
increases in residential segregation, picketing of Catholic churches, and
a general rise in tension.
Though predominantly drawn from the ranks of working class
Protestants, members of the RUC became personas non gratas to their
parading neighbors. At Drumcree, crowds labeled the police as traitors
even though some of the police were close relatives of the protesters.
Orange supporters intimidated RUC officers by announcing the names
and addresses of officers' family members over loudspeakers near their
homes.396 As Coogan notes, "[o]ne police officer who had allegedly
suffered a miscarriage, was threatened that she would 'never give birth
to another living thing.'
397
Thus, the authorities charged with keeping public order find
themselves in a no-win situation. Desperately needing to disassociate
themselves with a biased and sectarian past, the RUC must stand firm on
parade decisions unfavorable to the Loyalist community. Yet the RUC
is still vulnerable to Loyalist influences, that either push or pull the RUC
into capitulation. This merely re-enforces the deeply held belief in the
Catholic community that the government cannot protect their rights.
B. Public Parades and the Processions Act
The Drumcree standoff highlighted the inherent incompatibility of
existing public order regulation in the context of Northern Ireland, and
prompted Westminster to do something to correct the flaws. Nearly as
soon as the rioting subsided in 1996, Westminster created an
independent body to study the parades issue and make
recommendations. On January 30, 1997, the Independent Review of
Parades and Marches (North Report) was released.9 The Report stated,
"that the right to peaceful free assembly should (subject to certain
qualifications) be protected," but that, "the exercise of that right brings
with it certain responsibilities; in particular, those seeking to exercise
that right should take account of the likely effect their actions would
have on their relationship with other parts of the community and be
396. See COOGAN, supra note 10, at 516.
397. Id.
398. Jim Cusack, Chairman Says Consensus is the Cure, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 31,
1997.
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prepared to temper their approach accordingly."'39 The report also
recommended negotiation and accommodation, and the renunciation of
criminal acts.
The North Report's most significant recommendation was the creation
of an independent Parades Commission, appointed by the Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland that would:
(a) allow interested parties to put their views forward about proposed parades;
(b) encourage them to settle difficulties locally and, where that proved
impossible;
(c) itself come to a view on what, if any, conditions should be imposed on
contentious parades after an appropriately transparent process of
examination of all the relevant issues against the background of reformed
legal provisions.4w
The report promoted broad-based and transparent mediation among all
actors, including the RUC and the British government.401 The Parades
Commission was to be given power to impose restriction on contentious
parades as well. However, the ultimate decision on such restrictions still
lay with the Secretary of State, upon recommendation by the RUC. 2
Ultimately, the North Report received wide support. The Labour
Party in Westminster, through its shadow Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland, Dr. Mo Mowlam, indicated that, if in power, Labour would
implement the report's recommendations. 3 Her statements came amid
the Conservative government's reluctance to go ahead. The U.S. State
Department strongly urged that the report's recommendations be
implemented within the year °.4  Right wing Loyalists were of a different
opinion, however. 45 The Chief Executive of the Grand Lodge (Orange),
Mr. George Patton, said, "It is obvious that anyone who believes in
freedom of assembly and freedom of movement must reject the
draconian powers being given to the commission through the Public
399. INDEPENDENT REvIEW OF PARADES AND MARCHES, FIRST REPORT, 1997,
Recommendation § § 1 (a), 1 (b) [hereinafter NORTH REPORT] (available at http://www.
nio.gov.uk/press/north.htm.).
400. NORTH REPORT, supra note 396, recommendation §§ 2(a), 2(c).
401. See Jim Cusack, Chairman Says Consensus is the Cure, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 31,
1997.
402. See NORTH REPORT, supra note 396, recommendation §§ 19(a), 19(c).
403. See Frank Millar, Mowlam Backs Parades Body, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 31, 1997.
404. See Joe Carroll, US Wants Commission In Operation This Year, IRISH TIMES,
Feb. 1, 1997.
405. See Suzanne Breen, Magee May Be Hard To Replace on Commission, IRISH
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1997.
Processions Bill. ' ' °
The report was later codified in the Public Processions Act 1998407
after the Labour Party, led by Tony Blair, assumed the government. The
primary aim of the new law is to seek accommodation at the local level.
The British government has conceded, "that the support of the whole
community is needed to find an agreed resolution to an increasingly
contentious issue that has generated distressing scenes of confrontation
in recent years.' ' 0 8  To reach community-based resolution, the Act
authorized the creation of the Parades Commission independent from the
British government. 4' The government is correct in theory, though it
failed to follow the theory in practice.
The Parades Commission has a statutory responsibility for issuing
determinations in respect of proposed public processions and may
impose certain conditions upon such parades with respect to the time,
place and manner of the parade. Members of the Commission are
appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The Act
further requires the Secretary of State to exercise her powers of
appointment so as to insure that, as far as is practicable, the membership
of the Commission is representative of the community in Northern
Ireland.'
Essentially, the Parades Commission will review a parade only when
accommodation between those who wish to parade and those who wish
to protest cannot be reached. In that event, the Commission will gather
background information itself and take direct evidence from interested
parties.4 2 The information to be gathered includes the details of past
parades, the demographic mix of the local community, and facts about
the local area and the key points on the parade route such as churches
and any landmarks of sensitive historical significance.4 3  The
Commissioners will consider advice from the RUC about the extent to
which the parade in its proposed form would result in public disorder or
damage to property. Having taken into account all the relevant
information, evidence and advice, the Commission then meets to decide
406. Id.
407. Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act, 1998, ch.2 (Eng.).
408. NORTHERN IRELAND INFORMATION SERVICE, A GUIDE To THE PUBLIC
PROCESSIONS (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1998 (Feb. 24, 1998) (available at
<http://www.nio.gov.uk/press/980224d-nio.htm>).
409. See Public Processions Act 1998, ch. 2, Sched. 1.2.
410. See Public Processions Act 1998, ch. 2, §§ 8, 10.
411. See Public Processions Act 1998, ch. 2, sched. 1.3.
412. See PARADES COMMISSION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, PROCEDURAL RULES §§ 1,
2 (available at <http://www.paradescommission.org/pubs/proc.htm>). Alistair Graham
is the current Chairman of the Parades Commission.
413. See id. at § 2.
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whether or not to impose conditions.
Section 8(6) of the act proposes that in determining whether to impose
such conditions on a parade, the Commission should have regard to:
(a) any public disorder or damage to property which may result from the
procession;
(b) any disruption to the life of the community which the procession may
cause;
(c) any impact of the procession on relationships within the community;
(d) any failure to comply with the Code of Conduct (whether in relation to the
procession in question or any previous procession); and
(e) the desirability of allowing a procession customarily held along a
particular route to be held along that route.
44
Though, no longer the chief decision-maker, the RUC continues to
play an important role. The police will work closely with the Parades
Commission and when the Commission decides to issue a determination
on a parade, the Chief Constable may, if he is unhappy with the
determination, ask the Secretary of State to review it. The Secretary of
State must then either confirm, amend or revoke the determination.15
The police may also continue to use the powers they already have to
impose conditions on any protest meeting or counter demonstration
where they believe that the meeting may lead to serious public disorder,
serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the
community."' The police also retain their existing powers to take
whatever action they consider necessary on the day of the parade to
prevent loss of life, injury, damage to property and so on. '
The Act leaves the Secretary of State with the ultimate veto power
over the Parade Commission's decisions, and advises her to seek the
RUC's counsel when exercising that power.4 8 The Secretary of State
will also consider the evidence given the Commission in connection
with the parade and whatever additional evidence the Chief Constable
has provided. The Secretary of State then considers the same factors
that were taken into account by the Commission, including any undue
demands which the procession may make on the police or military
forces.4 9 If it is necessary in the public interest to do so, she may order
414. Public Processions Act 1998, § 8(6).
415. See NORTHERN IRELAND INFORMATION SERVICE, supra note 408.
416. See id.
417. See id.
418. Public Processions Act 1998, ch. 2, § 11
419. Public Processions Act 1998, ch. 2, § 8.11(2)(d).
any and all parades banned for a period of up to 28 days.42 °
VIII. WHERE THE PUBLIC PROCESSIONS ACT FAILS
The Public Processions Act offers many fresh ideas to solve the
apparent zero-sum dilemma. It creates a forum in which grievances can
be heard and addressed. It fosters dialogue between the two
communities, while at the same time, it forces both to share the burdens
that free assembly and the right of passage necessarily entail. Moreover,
because both communities have a greater voice in the decision-making
process, the finger-pointing that occurs when the authorities take
unfavorable action carries much less weight and stubbornness appears
more irrational.
However, the Act still leaves the ultimate power with the police, thus
ignoring the phenomenon in Northern Ireland that helped to create the
need for the act. After the Drumcree incident in 1996, the U.S. State
Department issued a blistering report on the condition of human rights in
Northern Ireland. The report stated that the decision to allow the Orange
march at Drumcree, "damaged the RUC's reputation as an impartial
police force.4 2' It further stated that security personnel unduly harassed
citizens in areas where terrorist activity appeared to be strong. Without
credibility, any structure dependant upon police enforcement will be
ultimately rejected. Catholics who are continually rebuffed by the RUC
in attempts to re-route Orange parades away from their neighborhoods,
may withdraw from the process of reconciliation currently underway. If
the new structure is simply a mirror image of the old, very little support
will be forthcoming, especially from the ultra-Nationalist IRA and its
supporters, who feel they must see a positive return on the all the
sacrifices its members have made "for the cause." Conversely, if the
RUC clamps down on the Orange parades, Loyalists will attempt to
exercise its influence, At the point in time where the Orange Order loses
all influence on the parades issue, it too will withdraw, and like the ultra-
Nationalists, reconsider physical force.
The events leading up to the 1997 stand-off at Drumcree near the town
of Portadown are the best indicators of the remaining flaws. Though the
Public Processions Act was not yet in operation, the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland and the Chief Constable of the RUC followed the
tenets of the Act, by engaging in proximity talks with the Portadown
420. See id.
421. Joe Carroll, Drumcree Damaged RUC Reputation Says US Report, IRISH
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997. Arguably, there was not much of a reputation of impartiality to
tarnish.
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Orangemen and the Garvaghy Road Residents Association. 42' The talks
were stalled, but no official pronouncement about the future of the
parade was made. At the eleventh hour, Ronnie Flannagan, the Chief
Constable, made a statement to the effect that the parade would go down
the road. He also said that banning the parade would create a worse
threat to disorder than letting it pass. Soon after, a convoy of armored
cars and troop carrers swarmed the Garvaghy road. Soldiers and RUC
battoned protesting residents off the road and held them in their houses
at gunpoint until the Orange parade had passed. Violence erupted in
Catholic areas throughout Northern Ireland, bringing the region to a near
standstill for 3 days.
A week later, a document was leaked indicating that the decision had
been made nearly two weeks before to let the parade pass if no
accommodation was reached.424 The document, dated June 20th, says
that at the time it was being written the Chief Constable of the RUC, Mr.
Ronnie Flannagan, had "genuinely" not taken a decision on the parade.
His decision was finally revealed on Sunday morning. Nevertheless, the
document added that, "the consensus among the key players-the
Secretary of State, the Minister of State, the Chief Constable, the GOC
(General Officer Commanding the British army in the North), the
Parades Commission Chairman-is that, if there is no local
accommodation, a controlled parade on the Garvaghy Road is the least
worst outcome., 425 Thereafter, Nationalists were arguably left to believe
that by simply refusing to negotiate with Nationalist residents groups,
the Orangemen would ultimately prevail and be permitted to march
through contentious areas.
While invariably these tough decisions must be made, the history of
Northern Ireland tells us that making these decisions behind closed
doors only adds to the atmosphere of paranoia and mistrust.
Nationalists are still deeply troubled by the RUC's involvement in the
decision-making process. Breandan MacCionnaith of the Garvaghy
Residents' Coalition made the following statement,
The Processions [Act] recognizes the right to march, with some qualification,
but it doesn't give the same recognition to the rights of residents, the rights of
422. See RUC May Prevent Parade Through Garvaghy, IRISH TIMES, July 5, 1997.
423. See id.
424. See Deaglan De Breadan, March Permission 'Best Option', IRISH TIMES, July
8, 1997.
425. Id.
marchers take absolute precedence. The North Commission had not addressed
the RUC's religious and political make-up or its behavior last year. . . . Thirty
per cent of RUC officers are members of the Orange Order, the Apprentice
Boys or the Black Perceptory. The [Act] ignores that and the mass disaffection
and virtual mutiny of the RUC at Drumcree last year. The RUC quite clearly
cannot implement the law impartially, yet the [Act] allows it to have the final
say on the parades issue.
426
The RUC is the only actor that may in reality appeal a decision by the
Parades Commission. The Chief Constable, if unhappy with a
determination, may appeal to the Secretary of State, who then relies on
the Chief Constable to provide the justifications for overturning thet' • • 427
Parades Commission. Though the Parades Commission is an
independent body, its will is still potentially subject to political
maneuvering and sectarian pressures.
The Unionist reaction to the Parades Commission is even more
troubling. Speaking at the Ulster Unionist Party Conference in October
1998, the first Prime Minister of the newly re-organized Northern State
and a co-recipient of the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize, Mr. David Trimble
made the following statements:
It is also with regret that we must remind government that the statutory
arrangements [Westminster] put in place to regulate the traditional events of the
summer failed, and failed abysmally. As we predicted, the Parades Commission
has been an abject failure. They made no attempt, no attempt at all, to discharge
their conciliation and mediation function. Their misconceived regulatory
function has been exercised in a high-handed and unfair manner. Indeed, my
one meeting with that body left me astonished at the arrogance of some
commission members. There must be radical changes before next year....
Those on the Garvaghy Road who are responsible for creating the problem and
whose intransigence in prolonging it are probably the only ones pleased.
Thanks to Alistair Graham and his commission, they need do nothing and
consequently cannot expect much to be done by them.
428
Mr. Trimble also made clear his and the Government's continued
support of the Orange Order:
Government has to resume the responsibilities it abdicated. It must also show
that full respect for civil and cultural rights and parity of esteem for the identity
and ethos of the community are not just empty words, but have real meaning for
the largest cultural organization in Northern Ireland.
429
Moreover, one must question Mr. Trimble and the new government's
commitment to accommodation and reconciliation. As summarized in
426. Suzanne Breen, RUC Role In Policing Parades "Ignoring", IRISH TIMES, Jan.
31, 1997.
427. See Public Processions Act 1998, ch. 2, § II.
428. The Offer Of Partnership Stands, But Only If Past Is Left Clearly Behind, IRISH
TIMES, Oct. 26, 1998.
429. Id.
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the Irish Times:
The Irish territorial claim is gone.. .To put it another way, look at what Sinn
Fin were saying at the beginning of this year. They said there would be no
change to articles 2 and 3 [of the Irish Constitution]. They have changed. They
said there would be no return to Stormont. We are back there .... Sinn F6in said
there would be joint authority. There isn't. Sinn FHin said there would be
powerful cross-Border bodies with no unionist veto. The North/South council
will have no executive authority and any agreements made in it will require the
approval of the Assembly. On all these matters Sinn Fin were driven below
their bottom line.
430
In the context of regulating contentious parades, the Unionist Party
seems ready to pressure the Secretary of State (Northern Ireland) to
exercise her veto power over the Parades Commission. If this pressure
is exerted, the Secretary of State (Northern Ireland) may have little
choice but to capitulate, lest she risk the collapse of the peace process,
despite the inevitable Catholic retaliation. If there is no real power-
sharing and oversight of the government's actions, as Mr. Trimble
claims, Catholics will have no official avenues of recourse, and may find
themselves left out once more.
Furthermore, membership on the Parades Commission is not protected
from political pressure either. In April 1998, two of the seven
Commissioners resigned. Glen Bar, a prominent Loyalist leader,
stepped down after just two months on the Commission. A week before,
Ulster Unionist leader, David Trimble, was apparently informed that,
"the Commission was about to reveal in a 7,000-word preliminary
analysis of the marching season and that it was inclined to take the view
that the controversial Orange march from Drumcree Church along the
Garvaghy Road in Portadown should be rerouted., 431  There had been
speculation that the Commission had decided to ban the Drumcree
parade and there were suggestions that Mr. Barr was about to step down
as a result of this decision. '32 Mr. Barr stressed he had no difficulties
with the Commission, the concept on which it has been established or
430. Id. See also Political Uncertainty Returns To North As Direct Rule Is
Reimposed, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 12, 2000. By threatening to resign as the First Minister if
the IRA did not decommission arms pursuant to a Unionist imposed time table, David
Trimble essentially threatened to withdraw Unionist support for the new power-sharing
executive, if Unionist demands were not met. Arguably, such a position reflects very
poorly on Unionists' willingness to accommodate. See id.
431. Commission's Credibility Vanishing With Its Members, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 24,
1998.
432. See id.
the decisions it was likely to make, but further added, "that he was
stepping down because of enormous pressure from the media and
others," and could, "anticipate a situation in which I would become the
focus of speculation in every future decision of the Commission." '433
That same afternoon another Loyalist member of the Commission,
Tommy Cheevers, of the Apprentice Boys, tendered his resignation as
well. 34
Even well-wishers of the Commission, who are hard to come by in
either community, admitted the situation was "a real mess." The Irish
Times commented that "[I]t will be extremely difficult to get anyone
with a shred of 'street cred.' to serve on the commission in place of
Messrs. Barr and Cheevers. 435
Finally, the Public Processions Act contemplates mediation between
both communities, but the Commission is not in the best position to
foster such mediation. The Act provides that the Commission may
"facilitate mediation between parties to particular disputes ... and take
other steps as appear to the Commission to be appropriate for resolving
such disputes. 4 4 However, the Commission cannot effectively mediate
between parties if it must later make a ruling against one side if the
mediation should fail. The goal of mediation is to promote compromise,
which is undermined when the final arbiter acts as mediator.
Unfortunately, when appearing before a mediator with adjudicative
authority, the parties will be more likely to adopt an adversarial posture
rather than reveal areas of potential concession as required in the process
of effective mediation.
IX. CONCLUSION
The challenges posed by Northern Ireland's history render the present
system of parade regulation imperfect. Distrust, whether rational or
irrational, continues to keep the two communities apart despite the
current success of the peace process. This mistrust flares up and
threatens to engulf the province in tit-for-tat violence each summer as
ancient animosities are trotted out during the Orange parading season.
At this point, the two authorities with the ultimate authority to ban or
restrict parades lack the trust of both sides of the controversy. The
British government, as represented by the Secretary of State, has
repeatedly snubbed Ulster Unionists by making overtures to the IRA, by




436. Public Processions Act 1998, § 2(2)(a).
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Kingdom has no real interest in Northern Ireland. Similarly, the local
authority, the RUC, is so closely associated with the Unionist party, and
perhaps guilty of historical complicity with Unionist oppression of the
Catholic population, that Catholic Nationalists resent any involvement of
the RUC in local matters. Yet, the Public Processions Act has cemented
their role in the parade regulation process, when that process reaches
impasse. Thus, a decision by either of these authorities is subject to
blame-laying by the "losing" party, and a subsequent dismissal of the
appropriateness of the process itself. When these two authorities flip-
flop, both communities become further disenchanted. Moreover, the
system of regulation doesn't address the greater problem of mutual
distrust. The ultimate decisions regarding contentious parades are not
made by the actors themselves. Thus, those creating and maintaining
sectarian tensions may avoid responsibility for the consequences of their
actions. The current system allows each opposing community to act
within a moral vacuum.
Moreover, the structure and powers of the new Northern Ireland
Assembly leave the role of the Secretary of State and the RUC uncertain
with regards to future parade regulation. On November 30, 1999, David
Trimble and Gerry Adams moved their parties into a power sharing
government in Northern Ireland, pursuant to the Good Friday Peace
Accord.437 Thereafter, Westminster transferred power over domestic
issues, excluding police and security, to the new Northern Ireland
Assembly.438 Thus, with legislative and regulatory power now shared
across community lines, one would think that the stage is now set for
future discussion, if not compromise about the parades issue among
those on both sides. However, despite devolution, the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland has retained responsibility for constitutional and
security issues in Northern Ireland, in particular law and order, policing
and criminal justice policy.4 39  The Secretary of State is also,
"empowered to set key policing objectives ... approves the appointment
of senior RUC officers... [and] appoints the members of the Police
Authority." 0 Arguably, the members of the new Assembly can easily
distance themselves from the consequences of a particular Parades
437. Impossible Dream Comes True, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Nov. 30, 1999.
438. See id.
439. See British Government, Northern Ireland Office (last visited Mar. 20, 2000)
(available at <http://www.nio.gov.uk/>).
440. Public Processions Act 1998.
Commission decision. They officially lack the power to do anything
about it. Complete control to restrict or ban any given parade rests with
the Parades Commission and the RUC, both officially beholden to a
British Cabinet post. Thus, the political leaders of Northern Ireland,
who were pressured into what is perhaps a reluctant compromise,
officially lack the constitutional authority to address an issue that
annually symbolizes the reasons for this reluctance in reaching peace.
Because ultimate authority in this matter still rests with institutions that
lack the popular support of both communities in Northern Ireland, future
unrest surrounding parade regulation offers those leaders who are still
wary of a permanent peace an easy excuse for following ancient patterns
of sectarian conflict.
The Public Processions Act 1998 is imperfect, but it may be the least-
worst solution to maintaining peace and public order. The summer of
1998 saw a few promising developments in this respect. The Parades
Commission prevented a repeat of the administrative fiascoes occurring
at Drumcree in 1996 and 1997, by banning the Orangemen from
marching down the Garvaghy road. And while Loyalists protested the
Commission's decision for weeks, the authorities held firm to their
decision. Moreover, Northern Ireland saw the rebirth of the political
middle, represented by the overwhelming "yes" registered by
referendum, in support of the Peace Process and a new Northern Ireland
Assembly." '
Yet the most significant event of the entire summer occurred in Derry.
Loyalist Apprentice Boys and the Nationalist Bogside Residents Group
reached an agreement on the contentious Derry Relief Day parade
scheduled every August. The deal was reached after three days of
intensive "shuttle negotiations" facilitated by the authorized officers of
the Parades Commission."2 The Apprentice Boys agreed that local
parent clubs would parade the walls on Saturday morning behind a
single band, but that the band would not play when passing the stretch
over the Nationalist Bogside.443 The BRG, in return, canceled a mass
Nationalist demonstration, originally planned to confront the 10,000
Apprentice Boys converging on Derry for the main parade on Saturday
afternoon. 4  A Loyalist demonstration to confront the Nationalist
441. See Deaglan De Breadun, 79% Of NI Voters Back Agreement Parties, IRISH
TIMES, June 18, 1998.
442. See Gerry' Moriarty, Nationalists And Loyalists In Derry Agree On Parade
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protest was also canceled."5
A representative of the Apprentice Boys said the Orange Order must
make its own decisions on parades, but added, "I think the rest of the
people of Northern Ireland have to take note of what has happened here.
If we can strike an agreement where we will have a trouble-free city on
Saturday, then surely it sets the stage for other areas." 6
While the Public Processions Act contemplates such local
accommodation, parade regulation and the peace process as a whole
would be better served if the Act took a more definitive step towards
requiring direct negotiation. The Act itself presumes negotiation
between the parties involved in a contentious parade, though does not
expressly require this."7 The Commission itself has acknowledged the
importance of direct negotiations, yet seems ill equipped to foster or
promote local accommodation.
Essentially, the system needs to require both the organizers of a
particular parade and its protesters to negotiate an accommodation
before any final decisions are reached by an authority equally respected,
or at least not reviled, by both communities. Representatives from each
side should meet and negotiate an accommodated agreement with the
assistance of an independent mediator. The mediator's primary task
would be to facilitate dialogue between the two sides, and to ensure that
both parties negotiate in good faith. As a secondary consideration, if
445. See id.
446. Id.
447. See supra Part V.G. Chapter 2, section 2(2)(a) of the Public Processions Act
1998 provides that the Parades Commission may, "facilitate mediation between parties to
particular disputes concerning proposed public processions and take such other steps as
appear to the Commission to be appropriate for resolving such disputes." Public
Processions Act 1998, § 2(2)(a).
448. Recent Commission rulings on contentious parades have contained language
that sets forth the importance of direct dialogue. See PARADES COMMISSION,
DETERMINATION IN RELATION TO THE PORTADOWN DISTRICT LOL No 1 PARADE IN
PORTADOWN ON SUNDAY, 19 DECEMBER 1999 (available at
<http://www.paradescommission.org/sept99/dec99.htm>).
In our determination on the Drumcree church parade on 4 July 1999 we stated,
'The Commission expects both parties to maintain direct dialogue as a
demonstration of mutual respect and as the only means of securing local
accommodation for future years.' The Commission has been formally advised
that the talks under the chairmanship of Adam Ingram to resolve the parades
dispute in Portadown have broken down. The Commission continues to expect
both parties to seek to maintain dialogue with a view to addressing their
respective legitimate concerns and reaching a local solution.
Id.
negotiations should fail, the Parades Commission should seek the
opinion of the mediator as to each side's good faith negotiating efforts,
and consider this as a factor in determining whether to order a parade
restricted or prohibited. This step in between a parade application and
the Commission's final determination, though not calculated to resolve
all problems, would at least require historical adversaries to sit at the
table first. Unionist and Nationalist political leaders reached a
settlement for a peaceful way forward only through negotiation and
pressure from outside. Why should Unionists and Nationalists at the
street level be treated any differently?
Understandably, there may develop an impasse in negotiations in
which some individual must have the ability to make a decision. In this
respect, the current role of the Parades Commission must be preserved.
Regrettably, the situation is not conducive for a "baby-splitting" solution
in which the threat of ultimate decision forces concessions from both
sides. However, to ensure accountability, all parties must agree to a
minimum standard of civility towards each other to apply during every
parade or protest, enforced through the civil and criminal law. At a
minimum, each side must recognize the other's legitimate right to parade
or to protest. Both parade organizers and protesters must provide their
own stewards to ensure that all mandated guidelines are followed, and
both parade organizers and protesters must be held accountable for
violations of the law and the decisions of the Parades Commissions.
Thus, should local accommodation fail, certain unchangeable safeguards
will remain in place regardless of, and wholly independent from, the
Parades Commission's final determination.
In any event, compelled mediation or arbitration prior to the Parades
Commission decision may have positive results, such as peaceful
accommodation and resolution of contentious parades. In this respect,
mediated conflict resolution takes a step forward to the primary goal of
heading off the sectarian confrontations that often lead to province-wide
civil unrest.
However, mandatory mediated negotiation contains a deeper
importance, by providing a forum in which the actors themselves can
work to remove the zero-sum effect that has plagued community
relations in Northern Ireland for centuries. Both sides of the community
suffer from long held misconceptions about the other. For loyal
Protestants, Irish Nationalism continues to pose the specter of treachery
from within. For Catholic Nationalists, history has left them with a firm
belief that the Protestants desire to treat Catholics as second-class
citizens. Thus, both communities are equally wary and distrustful of the
intentions of the other. Dialogue at the grass-roots community level
could relieve those responsible for communal entrenchment of their
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persistent "must prevail" mind-set. Neighborhood sectarian movements,
most often the catalysts of communal conflict, will be forced to talk to
the other. Each side ought to be able to voice its grievances and educate
the other side while simultaneously receiving an education, and
ultimately an understanding of the "other culture." The current system
of parade regulations maintains the zero-sum formula by causing every
parades decision reached to be disfavored by at least one community, if
not both. Without a structured mediation step interposed between the
"grievance" stage and the "decision" stage, the current system stalls the
period of mutual education necessary to create a lasting peace, and
provides those resistant to progress with ample reasons to return to the
days of the gun."4'
While the political leaders were pressured into negotiating the Good
Friday agreement and the Framework Documents, no similar process has
been forced on the primary actors in the troubles: the neighborhood
associations, the populist organizations, the paramilitary groups and
those they influence. In this sense, the peace process should be treated
more homeopathically. The political leaders will certainly wrangle over
the direction of the new Assembly, and will attempt to garner support for
their anti-accommodating positions."5 Yet such support may be less
forthcoming from constituencies which are no longer insulated by so-
called "Peace Walls." The healing process may never begin if the troops
on the ground are never forced to confront their collective pasts.
One important question remains: why would forced negotiation work
now when it has failed in the past? The mechanics of the current peace
449. See BRYAN, supra note 27. They argue that the parading creates a sort of
political capital,
A number of political figures follow certain strategies to maximise their
'political capital.' The Rev. Ian Paisley has no role within the Orange
Institution, but nevertheless played a prominent role in the debate. When, on
the Twelfth of 1986, Paisley described Portadown as a dispute about,
Iobedience and submission to Dublin.'
Id.
450. In December 1999, the Ulster Unionist Party only agreed to convene the new
power-sharing assembly on the condition that the IRA disarm pursuant to a Unionist
timetable. David Trimble, the Assembly's First Minister and the leader of the Ulster
Unionist Party vowed he would resign if the IRA had not made significant arms
decommissioning efforts by February 2000. Upon convening the new Assembly, the
IRA began a dialogue with Gen. John de Chastelain. However, unsatisfied with the
progress, Unionists threatened to pull out of the Northern Ireland Assembly. As a result
of these threats, Britain suspended the Assembly and reimposed direct rule over
Northern Ireland's affairs, plunging the Peace Process into deep crisis. See Political
Uncertainty Returns To North As Direct Rule Is Reimposed, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 12, 2000.
process provide the answer. Northern Ireland's political leaders, with
the majority support of their constituencies, have accepted the principles
of the Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britian and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland,
("Good Friday Peace Accord"), and with the advent of devolution, a
"three strand" approach towards governing Northern Ireland has
begun.45' Strand one involves the creation of democratic institutions
within Northern Ireland, such as the popularly elected Northern Ireland
Assembly. Strand two creates a North/South ministerial council made
up of representatives from both sides of the border. The council is
primarily concerned with providing a forum for discussion of cross-
border issues. Strand three creates a British-Irish Council to "promote
the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of
relationships among the peoples of these islands.'" 5' As indicated
earlier, as a result of the Good Friday Peace Accord, the Republic of
Ireland has dropped its constitutional claim to the whole island. 3 With
effective power in the hands of the people of Northern Ireland, and the
insult of articles 2 and 3 removed, Unionists may be comforted by the
fact that they ultimately control the constitutional destiny of Northern
Ireland.454  Similarly, the Unionist fear that Britain will unilaterally
abandon Ulster is rendered moot by the Agreement.4 ' For Catholics, the
executive power-sharing government and the official role that Dublin
will play in Northern Ireland arguably assures them that the Province
will not return to the "bad old days" of Unionist Stormont. Thus, parade
regulation reform will work now if it will work at all. More importantly,
the threat contentious parades pose to Northern Ireland's social fabric is
particularly ominous this year due to the current uncertainty in the Peace
Process.
The current crisis stems from the impasse over the arms
451. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britian
and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland, April 10, 1998 [hereinafter the
Good Friday Peace Accord]. The text of the Good Friday Peace Accord is available at
<http://www.ni-assembly.gov.uk/agreement.htm>.
452. The Good Friday Peace Accord, strand 3, § 1.
453. See Direct Rule In North Due To End At Midnight, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999.
454. The Good Friday Peace Accord codified the principle set forth in the Downing
Street Declaration, namely the signatories, both Unionist and Nationalist acknowledge,
[Tihat while a substantial section of the people of Northern Ireland share the
legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a united
Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely
exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and, accordingly, that
Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies
upon that which; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status
of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people.
Good Friday Peace Accord, constitutional issues, § I (iii).
455. See id.
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decommissioning issue. Essentially, Unionists and Nationalist disagree
over the time-table for turning in paramilitary weapons. Unionists have
always asserted that the IRA must decommission weapons before Sinn
F6in is allowed a seat in the new Northern Ireland cabinet. Nationalists
contend that decommissioning must be an ongoing process synchronized
with the Northern Ireland Assembly's exercise of its newly devolved
powers. In February, 2000, Unionist leader, David Trimble, threatened
to carry out his promise to resign if the IRA had not significantly
disarmed. In order to prevent the Peace Process from being scuttled by
this impasse, Westminster passed legislation suspending the Northern
Ireland Assembly, presumably until a new compromise is reached. The
decommissioning issue is an ideological disagreement between the polar
ends of Northern Ireland's political spectrum. The issue may have the
affect of dividing the rest of the population who is otherwise united in
their desire for peace. It is unclear whether the Peace Process will get
back on track anytime soon. However, the current political decisiveness
will almost certainly influence social attitudes for and against this year's
contentious parades. Since public opinion is all that seems to be
currently carrying the Peace Process forward, steps must be taken now to
ensure that momentum towards a lasting peace does not swing back the
other direction. A lack of dialogue between Orange marchers and
Catholic residents' groups during the coming parading seasons may
certainly have this undesired effect.
Perhaps, it is easy to point out the shortcomings of the law in this
context, but alternatives are very hard to find. Accommodation and
reconciliation are paramount to building a lasting peace in Northern
Ireland, yet in the absence of tough public order law that invariable cuts
one way or the other, peace and stability-prerequisites for
reconciliation-cannot exist. The Government's police powers cannot
be used to stop the bleeding; Northern Ireland's history has made this all
too clear. The police powers then must be viewed as a temporary
bandage, designed to slow the bleeding while the wounds heal. In this
regard, Britain and Northern Ireland's political leaders, if truly
committed to peace, should reform parade regulation in Northern Ireland
to spread the healing process beyond political leaders and down to the
street.
BRIAN P. WHITE
258
